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
SPETSNAZ (SPETSIAL'NOYE NAZNACHENIYE): THE SOVIET  
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
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Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence, June 1985

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
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## ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: SPETSNAZ: The Soviet Union's Special Operations Forces

Stephen Seth Beitler, Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence,  
December 1985

Thesis Committee Chairman: David R. Russell, Lieutenant-Colonel, United States Army

Soviet special operations forces or SPETSNAZ (spetsial'noye naznachenie) are often misidentified, commonly attributed with performing "super-human" endeavors, and are usually referred to in exaggerated numbers. Many of their political activities, which contribute toward maintaining communist party rule within the Soviet Union and its influence outside the Soviet Union, are often incorrectly compared ("mirror-imaged") with American military special operations. In many situations, SPETSNAZ are often deployed because they are politically reliable, and not because their mission is a special operation.

Historical analysis and a literature comparison was the methodology used for investigating the nature of SPETSNAZ. Many authors writing on SPETSNAZ apparently borrowed from other authors, embellishing originally inaccurate information which had to be compared, culled, and verified. Historical inference was also important since information on SPETSNAZ activities before and during the Second World War is more widely available than sparse post-war information.

SPETSNAZ conduct missions which are active measures (Aktivnyye meropriyatiya). But while it is clear the Soviets conduct active measures similar to American military special operations, there are many other political activities conducted by SPETSNAZ that also fall under the rubric active measures that are not similar to anything Americans would even imagine. "Spetsial'noye" or the "special" in troops of special purpose would normally be associated with the english world elite. Therefore, many of the forces touted by the west as conducting special operations are actually conducting political activities.


SPETSNAZ particularly pose a threat in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Reaction time to these forces will be short, at best, although they are not in as great numbers or diversity of units as previously suspected. SPETSNAZ brigada are responsible for military special operations. The KGB is the only other organization with SPETSNAZ forces for special operations.

Among the lessons for United States forces from SPETSNAZ organization and operations includes the operation of a dedicated agent network. This is essential to special operations and would have saved the United States much heartache in Iran. Also, the United States doesn't plan for the presence of SPETSNAZ during United States military operations. If the destruction or preservation of a target has broad implications on the course of a battle or war, than the possibility of encountering SPETSNAZ during an operation must be seriously addressed.

**SPETSNAZ: THE SOVIET UNION'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

by

**STEPHEN SETH BEITLER**



Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Defense Intelligence College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence  
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## INTRODUCTION

Since the 1917 Russian revolution, spetsial'noye naznachenije (SPETSNAZ) or troops of special purpose<sup>1</sup> have primarily deployed against the Soviet people to maintain communist party rule. SPETSNAZ trace their origin from the party, not the professional military, and are its praetorian guard. They are deployed in critical locations, have deported entire populations, and operate sensitive weapons systems, from katyusha rockets in the Second World War to special weapons today. Consequently, SPETSNAZ are often deployed because they are politically reliable, and not because their mission is a special operation.

Unfortunately, SPETSNAZ political activities are often mistaken as military special operations because they conduct both. An example of this misconception was the pronouncement that all military advisors are SPETSNAZ.

It is my suspicion that because of the political focus and sensitivity of such operations, Soviet military aid and GRU personnel may very well be under some type of KGB oversight or control. In a very real sense they, too, are spetsnaz forces when deployed out of the USSR in such places as Angola, Ethiopia, and, without doubt, Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

But there were several thousand advisors in Afghanistan prior to the 1978 Soviet invasion, and they all could not have been SPETSNAZ. While they are an important means of Soviet power projection, the propensity to identify as SPETSNAZ Soviet personnel or units deployed to accomplish atypical activities is endemic. They have even been confused with Soviet special troops (for example, engineer, chemical, signal, and railroad troops), which provide combat service support. This confusion results because these combat service support organizations are also designated troops of special purpose.

The range of threats posed by SPETSNAZ and various other elite Soviet units to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's rear echelons includes: espionage; subversion; sabotage; fifth-column activities; small-unit raids; large-scale airborne and naval raids to seize key terrain; penetrations on land for raiding or flanking; and large-unit deep penetrations into the operational or strategic rear to interdict strategic targets and assist fifth column activities.

While all of these operations are executed during desants, which are generally airborne or seaborne forces operations in the enemy's rear, they are not all special operations, although many have previously been mistakenly described as such. There is also a tendency to designate any Soviet operation in the enemy's rear as a special operation; just as Soviet personnel abroad are often misidentified as SPETSNAZ.

Interestingly, there is no Russian word for unconventional warfare or special operations, although there is a definition in Russian for the foreign term, unconventional warfare.

SPETSIAL'NYYE METODY VOYNY (foreign) (unconventional warfare)--A term used in the American press, meaning methods of conducting combat operations which combine sabotage terrorist operations in enemy rear areas with "psychological" impact upon his troops and civilian population. The unconventional warfare concept is the brain child of imperialist militarists, playing its role in their plans for ideological diversion against socialist countries.<sup>3</sup>

But the Soviets do engage in guerrilla warfare and special operations, which they classify as active measures. Aktivnyye meropriyatiya or active measures are a spectrum of activities from assassination to forgery that supplement traditional diplomacy through unconventional means. Overt, covert, or clandestine, they include political influence operations (the most important, they include blackmail, intimidation, deception, utilizing agents of influence, and exploitation of unwitting contacts); propaganda operations (second in importance, they include media control or manipulation, clandestine radio broadcasting, mass demonstrations, and controlled international assemblies); written disinformation (including forgeries); operating foreign communist and socialist parties, international front organizations, or

"national liberation" movements; economic warfare; terrorism (including murder for psychological effect); and military special operations or paramilitary operations (including sabotage and assassination).

Active measures campaigns are concurrently employed worldwide to propagate a general theme that plays upon normal human fears and emotions. Regardless of their style or method of presentation, they attempt to distort perceptions of reality by causing popular attitudes and public policy to be formulated from sophistry. All active measures, particularly assassinations, are approved by the Politburo, the Central Committee, or the Secretariat. Their strategic goal is extending the Soviet Union's influence worldwide; while tactically, it is disrupting the military, economic, and moral strength of governments Moscow cannot otherwise influence. They even achieve benefits that may be unobtainable through conflagration.

In particular, military active measures are special operations characterized by surprise, shock, and pre-emption in the enemy's rear echelons; characteristics which help achieve the ultimate goal of a quick victory, while concomitantly insuring the rapid advance of the main Soviet force. The target country's military efficiency is reduced by this disruption, while its political will is reduced by disrupting national political and economic systems. Special operations are particularly effective in a war of maneuver as opposed to positional or attrition warfare. During an attack along the whole depth of an enemy's front, special operations conducted

deep in the enemy's rear may not create a victory, but they will reduce that enemy's will to resist and make the main force's mission easier to accomplish. But from the Soviet perspective, conducting special operations without a breakthrough is worthless, since without one, opportunities created could not be exploited.

Clearly, Soviet doctrine acknowledges active measures, and particularly its special operations component, can support an attacking main force by causing the enemy to do things the situation does not dictate. "A reliable way to seize and hold the initiative is... the use of methods of conducting combat new and unexpected for the enemy...."<sup>4</sup>

## CHAPTER I

### DOCTRINE

Marx and Engels espoused four aspects of modern warfare: diplomatic, economic, psychological, and as a last resort, military. Fully aware wars could be lost before the first shot is fired, they anticipated conflicts would be decided beforehand on the battlefields of economic and psychological warfare. "They certainly recognized that the many-fronted war was one and undivided and thus could be won or lost on the international battleline as well as by a nation's civil strife or within each citizen's faltering soul."<sup>5</sup>

For Lenin, war and revolution were continuously and fundamentally related. Peace was not an end in itself, but like war, was an instrument of policy. Referring to the famous Clausewitzian dictum "war is politics continued by other, in effect, forcible means," Lenin amplified "The Marxists have always considered this axiom...the theoretical foundation...of every war."<sup>6</sup> Although Lenin subscribed to Marx and Engels' dimensions of warfare, he advocated violence as the only means to create revolution and end capitalism.



Trotsky, architect of the Soviet civil war victory and father of the Red Army, also forged the bedrock of Soviet military doctrine. A believer in victory through offense, determining strategy case-by-case, adaptability, and elasticity, Trotsky conversely argued that a defensive war of attrition was the only war the Soviets could win because of their geographic position, size, and immature economy. While he could balance the revolution's continuing political offense with strategic military defense, other theoreticians, Frunze and Tukhachevsky particularly, could not and opposed him.

Trotsky's exile and assassination does not indicate his strategy was discarded. Out of his struggle developed the Soviet's Second World War defense-in-depth (active defense). Time has been Trotsky's vindication, and Stalin, while not a great strategic innovator, did admirably implement Trotsky's strategic doctrine. Stalin's novel emphasis on partisan warfare and special operations forces also set a precedent.

After the United States detonated the first atomic weapons, the Soviet's major strategic goal was to achieve parity (perhaps superiority), and subsequently, to project military power and presence. In 1968, the newly promulgated Brezhnev doctrine provided for Soviet assistance to "fraternal" nations.

Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko and Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov had long advocated expanding Soviet power projection and presence capabilities to permit conflict responses

short of nuclear retaliation. A superpower, the Soviet Union had to achieve political goals without resorting to armed conflict, while being perceived as willing to fight. In Armed Forces of the Soviet State, published in 1974, Marshal Grechko declared the Soviet army had become a "liberation" army able to suppress "local" wars, support wars of "national liberation," and provide military presence or assistance.

At detente's zenith, Secretary Brezhnev inaugurated the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976 declaring

...In shaping our foreign policy we now have to reckon, in one way or another, with the state of affairs in virtually every spot of the globe.... Our party is sending and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom...<sup>7</sup>

Afterward, the call for greater internationalism became increasingly apparent in Soviet military writings replete with phrases such as "the changing correlation of forces in favor of socialism," "the international responsibilities of the USSR," "the international position of the USSR," "the role of the Warsaw Pact in insuring international security," "the unconditional fulfillment of socialist obligations," "the consolidation of the worldwide socialist community," "patriots and internationalists," "international duty," "universal-historical mission," "world liberation movement," and "the universal state."

But the Soviet Union, having institutionalized doctrine in support of wars of "national liberation" and to suppress satellite countries that deviate from the socialist path, still lacked the military capability to achieve these goals.

The Soviet's best means of power projection, their naval infantry, were deactivated after the Second World War; and although they had good, tough airborne troops, they lacked airlift. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the Soviets hinted they might intervene militarily, but could not. Even in 1973, the Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that the vastly improved Soviet airlift forces were still ineffective. But Soviet power projection forces have since dramatically expanded to support policy. The threat of their impending deployment is alone an adequate reason for maintaining them, since the United States and other democracies no longer ignore them, as they did during the Suez crisis. Emphasis on power projection forces undoubtedly heralds doctrinal changes. But whatever changes do occur, they will still reflect the military philosophies and doctrine established by Trotsky and since developed. Fighting offensively, surprise, mass, deep penetration, special operations, concealment, and deception will still be emphasized.

To insure the success of an attacking force, Chief Marshal of Armored Forces and Doctor of Military Sciences Rotmistrov indicates action must occur against the entire depth of the enemy front; in the tactical zone, against operational and strategic reserves, headquarters, nuclear weapons, lines of communications, and key terrain. The application of massive firepower,

surprise, and unified action of all branches of all arms, including the airborne and amphibious forces, against the entire depth of the enemy's defense enables an attacking force to quickly overwhelm the enemy, eliminate resistance, restrict the opposing force's battlefield maneuvers, and inhibit effective leadership.<sup>8</sup>

From the Soviet perspective, the rear extends from the enemy's forward line of troops to their capitals. But tactical air reconnaissance only penetrates to 150-200 kilometers depth; armored reconnaissance to fifty kilometers depth; and, under exceptional circumstances, the divisional reconnaissance battalion to fifty kilometers depth along a fifteen-to-twenty kilometers front. Unlike these tactical operations, special operations are conducted at strategic and operational depths and have different command and control echelons and targets. Naval special operations span all three depths, primarily in support of the fleets.

Among their primary targets in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are: nuclear weapons and delivery systems; command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities and equipment; key lines of communications; key industrial targets; tactical combat support facilities and equipment; key terrain; and capturing prisoners-of-war and equipment.

Strategic missions are conducted in the enemy's heartland and are planned to have a major effect on the conduct of a war. Always under KGB control, they are conducted by units capable of acting independently against key

government centers; major logistic points; major headquarters; nuclear weapons; command, control, communications and intelligence facilities; and major ports. Their objectives are weakening readiness and combat effectiveness; intimidating the public; creating chaos; disrupting public services; and ultimately undermining the national will to resist and wage war. Strategic missions also include power projection and the support of "national liberation" wars.

Operational missions support the front commander and subordinate armies through employment of unexpected tactics at 350-1,000 kilometers depth. Conducted by SPETSNAZ or airborne units (up to division strength), their primary targets are enemy nuclear weapons within the front's area of operations. Other missions include pathfinding; intelligence collection; sabotaging command, control, communications and intelligence facilities; terrorizing local inhabitants; partisan operations; preventing reinforcement by reserve units; the seizure of key terrain and lines of communications; and preventing an orderly withdrawal.

Tactical missions are similar to operational ones, but are smaller in scale and penetrate only to 100 kilometers depth. Conducted by the divisional reconnaissance battalion's long-range reconnaissance patrol company, they are generally small-scale surprise attacks that only affect the engagement. Their targets are also similar to operational targets.

Most of these operations, whether strategic, operational, or tactical, cannot be conducted without long-range reconnaissance, which is also a SPETSNAZ mission.

...the most important and indispensable condition guaranteeing the holding of the initiative is constant, active reconnaissance. This makes it possible to discover in good time the intentions and plans of the enemy and thereby protect one's troops from the unexpected.<sup>9</sup>

Reconnaissance is the measures employed to obtain information about the political, economic, and military potential of an opponent. Reconnaissance activities include anything from a patrol a few kilometers forward of the main force to the penetration of an enemy capital or coast. Soviet military reconnaissance is strategic, operational, tactical, or naval.

There is uniformity in and centralized control of all levels of Soviet reconnaissance, including close cooperation between all echelons and agents. During peacetime, SPETSNAZ probably conduct numerous types of strategic reconnaissance activity, such as target intelligence, in preparation for a European war. Many commercial international truck drivers and merchant ship officers, for example, are assessed as SPETSNAZ conducting route reconnaissance on key lines of communications.

Operational reconnaissance is conducted by specialized units, including SPETSNAZ, to obtain intelligence concerning the enemy; terrain; nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare indicators; and any other intelligence required for the preparation and conduct of operations. It is "the most important form of support for the combat operations of troops."<sup>10</sup>

Tactical reconnaissance is performed to obtain information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and the area of operations in general. It is organized and conducted by unit commanders, and not SPETSNAZ, to the depth of their own combat mission or the enemy's combat formations.

Naval reconnaissance transcends all three reconnaissance depths, and is conducted against enemy air, ship, coastal, radio-technical, clandestine, and special (mine, ice, etc.) capabilities to obtain information about their naval forces and operations. SPETSNAZ are among the assets available to accomplish naval reconnaissance missions.

One author suggests special operations constitute a fourth reconnaissance depth that includes intelligence gathering and partisan operations. However, special operations are not conducted in a fish bowl. The implication that the strategic, operational, and tactical depths are conventional in nature, and that special operations are conducted aloof from them has no basis in Soviet doctrine.

## CHAPTER II

### ELITE FORMATIONS

#### Airborne Forces

The Soviets formed their first airborne detachment in 1929, and in 1930, a Soviet squad conducted an airborne assault by parachute during an exercise and captured an opposing corps headquarters. By 1938, there were five airborne corps, four in the western Soviet Union and one in the far east, each with three airborne brigades and one or two SPETSNAZ battalions (this unit composition is among the reasons for numerous author's opinions that airborne forces are SPETSNAZ). Five more corps were formed by the end of 1941.

During operation Barbarossa in 1941, the airborne corps' were thrown into the breach in Soviet lines as infantry against the invading Nazis, who had already destroyed most of the Red Army's transport aircraft. In 1942, the Fourth Airborne Corps deployed west of Moscow where it diverted Nazi forces for four months, although it was too weak to effectively interdict their lines of communications. During this campaign, 2,200 paratroops jumped at Vyazma and 7,000 dropped at Yuknov. But most airborne units deployed as "leg" infantry, which they were designated as in 1942. In 1943, the airborne forces were resurrected, and six new guards airborne divisions were activated. But at



Dnieper in September, the First, Third, and Fifth Guards Airborne Brigades were annihilated. Other battalion size or larger airborne operations were conducted during the Battle of Moscow, particularly in the Nazi rear; and during the seige of Odessa, where the naval infantry "linked-up" with the airborne forces; but for the most part, airborne operations were limited to small unit deployments for the remainder of the war.

One author writes the Soviet airborne's Second World War capabilities will forever remain unknown, while another declares they failed to use their airborne effectively, except for small "commando" or "partisan" drops.<sup>11</sup> Both are common misconceptions, since Soviet airborne forces were widely deployed throughout the war with varying degrees of effectiveness. After the war, the airborne forces were reorganized into three corps' with 100,000 personnel and only enough airlift for limited tactical operations. They were incapable of power projection.

During the 1956 Suez crisis, Secretary N. Khrushchev threatened Soviet airborne were prepared to deploy on behalf of the Arabs. An empty threat the western powers ignored, Suez demonstrated the Soviet desire to project power. The AN-12 cub's maiden flight was also in 1956, and its deployment three years later insured their failure during Suez would not be repeated. In the following years, the Soviets continued increasing the airborne's capabilities, designing dedicated equipment for them, including the ASU-57 assault gun and the BMD infantry fighting vehicle.

In August 1968, one author claims the 103rd Guards Airborne Division landed unopposed in Prague, Czechoslovakia and rendezvoused with armored and motorized units.<sup>12</sup> Another author writes that two airborne divisions took part in the invasion and that two others were ready to deploy; and a third contends military SPETSNAZ deployed under KGB control in airborne uniforms.<sup>13</sup> Their duties included securing key locations, kidnapping the Czech government, seizing key lines of communications, and route reconnaissance.

A fourth author claims a co-opted Czech Vojenska Kontrarozvedka (VKR or Military Intelligence Service) officer, Captain Vasil Frisnic, prepared the occupation of the Central Committee building and Prague military headquarters. He obtained Prague sewer system plans and located escape tunnels from both buildings. Soviet troops in airborne uniforms guarded these escape routes, effectively closing them.<sup>14</sup>

Operations in Prague are often attributed to the airborne forces, who were quite capable of accomplishing many of the missions. However, it appears most missions were conducted by KGB officers assisted by SPETSNAZ in airborne uniforms, particularly the more difficult, politically sensitive ones, such as Dubcek's abduction.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, claims of the Soviets mobilizing seven airborne divisions prompted the United States, on 25 October, to alert its forces. Three Soviet airborne divisions and VTA aircraft were reportedly

standing-by at their airfields.<sup>15</sup> These same forces also alerted for Cyprus.<sup>16</sup> Unlike Suez, the Soviets were now a credible threat, demonstrated by their ability to engender an American response.

The most recent Soviet airborne deployment was to Afghanistan. The 105th Guards Airborne Division, elements of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, and SPETSNAZ participated. Branigin alleges Moscow deployed three airborne regiments to Bagram air base, Shindand air base, and Kabul one month prior to the coup, directly contradicting Moscow's claim of responding to an Afghan request.<sup>17</sup>

Valenta claims only a Soviet airborne battalion deployed to Bagram air base in September 1979. Then, in early December, an airborne regiment augmented with armor and artillery deployed to accomplish the missions of controlling incoming flights and clearing the highway between the Soviet Union and Kabul. But Allard claims an airborne regiment equipped with BMDs first deployed to Bagram air base and then proceeded to Salang pass in mid-December to secure the highway between Kabul and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Valenta reports Soviet advisors (perhaps these advisors were SPETSNAZ) disarmed two Afghan armored divisions through a deception involving inventorying and maintenance practices. In late December, according to Allard, the Soviets began airlifting six flights per daylight hour for three days. Completely deployed to Kabul, Valenta further reports the 105th Guards Airborne Division was followed by two mechanized divisions.<sup>18</sup>

At 1900 on 26 December, the Soviets attacked key government buildings, the telecommunications center, and the presidential palace in Kabul. The attack on Amin's palace was led by the KGB (an earlier poisoning attempt, ordered by the Politburo, had failed). Hafizullah Amin, his family, and the palace guards were assassinated; and Colonel Bayerenov, a former director of the KGB terrorist training school, was killed in the attack.<sup>19</sup>

In another variation, the coup was initiated at 1930 with an attack on the Kabul telecommunications building. Soviet light armor and three battalions then attacked the radio and television stations, the People's House presidential palace, and the Durulaman Palace, where President Amin resided. Lacking finesse and displaying no compassion, the Soviets murdered Amin, his family members, and entourage. Amin's residence burned for twenty-four hours. Fiercely resisting, the Afghanis received high casualties, while killing twenty-five Soviets and wounding another 225. Concomitantly, Soviet forces massed across the border attacked.

A pre-recorded announcement by Karmal declaring his presidency was aired over Radio Moscow at 2030, although Kabul was not subdued until 2300, after which Karmal repeated the same announcement on Radio Afghanistan. But Karmal did not arrive in Kabul from Moscow until the next day, definitely proving the coup was orchestrated by the Soviets. By the time one reporter filed his article, he stated there were 30,000-40,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup>

In December 1980, Valenta asserts Soviet airborne forces were preparing to invade Poland.<sup>21</sup> Concomitantly, Soviet naval infantry were conducting beach landings near Tallin, ostensibly for the same purpose.

The vozdushno desantnyye voyska, or airborne forces, are often credited with accomplishing anything from tactical reconnaissance in support of a division to overwhelming enemy capitals, which many authors credit them achieving in Prague and Kabul.

Colonels I. I. Andrukhov and V. Bulatnikov write that airborne strikes must be coordinated "with nuclear strikes, troops attacking from the front (in operations in a coastal area, with the navy and amphibious landing forces), and also with the forces which protect the airborne landing from enemy action which may be SPETSNAZ."<sup>22</sup> This is far from many author's special operations claims for airborne forces, which have generally been used as elite infantry to accomplish sensitive missions or provide an example to regular troops. However, Colonels Andrukhov and Bulatnikov also proposed equipping airborne forces to act independently, without "linking-up" with ground troops. This proposal perfectly complements Soviet power projection goals, but is still not indicative of special operations.

Strategic airborne missions include seizing western capitals, headquarters, and key terrain, destroying missile bases (airborne forces will deploy against nuclear targets in a nuclear or non-nuclear war), disrupting

lines of communications, and power projection. Upon achieving their original objective, they advance to secondary targets. Airborne forces could be inserted after a nuclear attack, exploiting the ensuing disarray, and contributing to a decisive victory.

Operational airborne missions are also coordinated after nuclear strikes, but are generally surprise attacks against important targets or key terrain within the area of operations. The usual airborne landing, regimental size or larger, supports frontal objectives up to 300 kilometers behind enemy lines. Battalion size or smaller landings support army objectives up to 100 kilometers behind enemy lines.

Tactical missions are generally airmobile, do not use airborne forces, and penetrate no more than fifty kilometers depth to seize key terrain.

In peacetime, airborne forces are subordinate to the minister of defense and the general staff; but in wartime, the airborne and airlift forces are subordinate to the supreme commander and the STAVKA. They have their own command and control structure, only a casual relationship with the military districts, and are only deployed with the Politburo's consent. One author claims airborne forces are an independent arm of the armed services, but official Soviet doctrine identifies them as a ground forces branch. However, General of the Army V. F. Margelov, who commanded the eight airborne forces divisions from 1961-1979, held the same rank as the commander-in-chief ground forces, who commanded 170 divisions. The present airborne forces commander is General of the Army D. S. Sokhorukov.

Airborne division personnel estimates vary, but the United States Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center estimates it contains 800 officers and 7673 enlisted personnel. A regiment contains 2,008 personnel, including 171 officers and 1,837 enlisted personnel; a battalion 350 personnel; and a company eighty personnel.<sup>23</sup> Triangularly organized, airborne divisions are always at full strength or category one (with the exception of the 106th Guards Airborne Division, which serves as a training division). But confusion still abounds in unclassified literature concerning their strength and number. Estimates range from 50,000 to 80,000 personnel.<sup>24</sup> Eight divisions, all of which are designated with the honorary guards title, is the generally accepted order-of-battle, although one author asserts there are ten.<sup>25</sup>

The generally accepted unit composition is depicted in figure one, although one author disputes it, as shown. Five of an airborne division's nine line battalions are equipped with armored vehicles, and the whole division is now fully motorized with over 1,500 vehicles.<sup>26</sup> Airborne divisions are hardly configured for the express purpose of special operations.

Authors cannot even agree on unit locations, as shown in figure two, demonstrating how much has been read into the literature, and its imprecision.<sup>27</sup>

Airborne personnel serve their entire career with the airborne forces, ninety percent are Komsomol (Young Communist's League) members, and many were members of Dobrovol'noye obshchestvo sodeystviya armii, aviatsii, i flotu (the





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A map of the U.S.S.R. and surrounding regions, showing military districts and major cities. The map includes labels for various districts such as NORTH CAUCASUS, VOLGA, SIBERIAN, TRANSBAIKAL, FAR EAST, TURKESTAN, CENTRAL ASIA, and AFGHANISTAN. Major cities like MOSCOW, LENINGRAD, KIEV, and ODESSA are marked. The map also shows neighboring countries like FINLAND, SWEDEN, and CHINA. A legend in the top left corner identifies symbols for 'Author "A"', 'Author "B"', and 'Unlocated'. A scale bar indicates distances up to 500 miles.

Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy, or DOSAAF), which includes parachuting in its curriculum. They are elite volunteers who undergo rigorous selection and training, receive the best equipment, and most importantly, are politically reliable. It is believably rumored there are few ethnic minorities among their ranks.

Airborne forces run their own training establishments. Basic training is conducted at seven airborne schools, parachute training at the Tula-Ryazan airborne complex, and the airborne forces even have their own staff college, the Red Banner Airborne Forces' Higher Command School at Ryazan, Moscow Military District. Unit and individual training stresses independent action on protracted missions in various terrain and climates. Training is even conducted at life-size and precisely detailed models of western headquarters and missile bases.<sup>28</sup> Highly motivated politically, individualism among airborne personnel is stressed to a greater degree than elsewhere.

A recent Soviet article described an airborne battalion raiding a special weapons depot during an exercise. The airborne infantry battalion, equipped with BMD infantry fighting vehicles, was task organized with an attached ASU-85 assault gun battery and an attached engineer platoon. After an assault jump, the Second Airborne Infantry Battalion task force accomplished its mission at the special weapons depot and at its secondary objective, and awaited "link-up" with the main force.<sup>29</sup>

The assault drop would have required one half the Soviet IL-76 Candid inventory, and air superiority in a European conflict would be difficult to accomplish, making the assualting force extremely vulnerable. Because of the expected "link-up," refueling the BMDs caused no logistic problems, but would have if the mission had been deeper. Ammunition would also have become a critical problem, and as the force penetrated deeper, the probability of air resupply diminished.

While the article ignored too many problems, it demonstrates how even an airborne battalion task force is severely restricted by logistics. This operation was indicative of a conventional desant, not a special operation. SPETSNAZ battalions would only be equipped with BMDs and supporting assault guns and engineers under exceptional circumstances or in special terrain situations; since their small size and limited mobility defeats their purpose.

Numerous authors claim there are spetsnaznacheniya vozdushno-desantnykh voysk or special purpose airborne troops; razvedyvatelno-diversionnoe podrazdelenie, or special reconnaissance-sabotage units; reydoviki or rangers; vysoтники or special forces; and a unit at Neuruppin, the German Democratic Republic, which is variously described as an airborne regiment on twenty-four hour alert, a reydoviki brigade, a special paratrooper unit, and a parashutnyy polk osobogo naznacheniya or special purpose airborne regiment. But these terms were probably invented by western authors to account for unexplained capabilities and force structures, since they do not appear in Soviet literature. Authors

insist they vary in size from a division to a squad. One author claims two of these divisions chop to the KGB, while another believes these units are directed by the KGB's third directorate, which monitors all military units.<sup>30</sup>

Personnel in these units are allegedly trained in multiple specialties, foreign languages, parachuting, SCUBA, rigorous physical training, martial arts, terrorist operations, reconnaissance, sabotage, demolitions, and partisan operations. Their missions supposedly include reconnaissance, sabotage, pathfinding, intelligence gathering, and partisan operations. Their personnel reportedly often train in the uniforms of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries for the purpose of disrupting North Atlantic Treaty Organization rear area operations.

Claiming there are at least six more units in the Soviet Union similar to the one at Neuruppin, plus other special units, one author asserts they are organized in 2,500 personnel brigades with three-to-four airborne battalions and an indigenous air transport support unit. Lacking armored vehicles or multiple rocket launchers, they are equipped with more anti-tank weapons and mortars than regular units. Organized to suit unique mission requirements, each company generally has forty-to-fifty personnel in six squads, or eighty-to-one hundred personnel with anti-tank weapons, mortars, and smaller wheeled vehicles.<sup>31</sup>

Although atypically large, the Neuruppin unit's missions are similar to those attributed to SPETSNAZ brigada. And its size is appropriate for a tailored special operations unit in the Warsaw Pact forward area. Since there

is nominally one SPETSNAZ brigada for each group of forces, it seems logical the unit at Neuruppin is the brigade for the group of forces in the German Democratic Republic.

Three authors credit Soviet operations in Prague in 1968 to special purpose airborne units, while another author credits a special reconnaissance-sabotage unit. These authors also attribute initial Soviet operations in Afghanistan to these units, who they claim deployed as advisors to Bagram air base just prior to the invasion.<sup>32</sup> Many missions authors credit to the Soviet airborne, others attribute to airborne special purpose troops or special reconnaissance-sabotage units. It seems improbable these latter formations are as large or heavily equipped as some authors contend. As their size increases, their effectiveness diminishes on the missions they are credited with accomplishing. These units are probably SPETSNAZ in airborne uniforms. There is no distinctive SPETSNAZ uniform. Some authors appear to have let their imaginations run away with them.

Some confusion may arise from the Soviet's airborne division definition. The special troops noted, which are combat service support troops, may have been confused with SPETSNAZ.

VOZDUSHNO-DESANTNAYA DIVIZIYA (airborne division)--The basic combined-arms operational-tactical [no mention of strategic] formation of airborne troops. It consists of several regiments, (artillery) battalions Divizionnyye chast'i, subunits of the various services, and special troops. An

airborne division is intended to carry out missions in the enemy's deep rear, in coordination with ground troops and missile forces formations, and also with the air force and navy.<sup>33</sup>

The former airborne forces commander, General of the Army V. F. Margelov, described the airborne forces mission as conducting "operations in coordination with the main arms of the ground so as to ensure the high speed and continuity of the offensive."<sup>34</sup> These operations are primarily in the enemy's rear, but they are not special operations, and airborne troops are not SPETSNAZ.

## Airlift Forces

The Soviet equivalent of the United States' Military Airlift Command is Voyenno transportnaya aviatsiya (VTA). During an airborne operation, assigned VTA elements are under the airborne force commander's control. VTA's strategic airlift capability is based on the IL-76 Candid (C-141 equivalent), the AN-22 Cock, and the experimental AN-124 Condor (C-5 equivalent). Its operational/tactical capabilities are based on the AN-12 Cub (C-130 equivalent), the AN-72 Coaler (YC-14 equivalent), and helicopters.

Soviet commercial and military aircraft are the same; and Aeroflot AN-12s, AN-22s, and IL-76s often augment the VTA. This facilitates the clandestine deployment of troops, for example, in Czechoslovakia during the 1968 Soviet invasion. Many writers allude to Soviet mass airborne drops, and entire airborne divisions were mass infiltrated by parachute on conventional missions during exercise DNEPR in 1967, DVINA in 1970, and YUG in 1971; but these missions require air superiority in wartime. For power projection, air landings of large formations in airports secured by smaller forces is more likely. Aeroflot also has extensive international routings, enabling it to deploy airborne forces without attracting suspicion. This capability is particularly desirable for deploying smaller SPETSNAZ units. Conversely, United States military aircraft have unique signatures and are not necessarily

suitable for covert operations. But Soviet aircraft have not demonstrated any special operations capabilities, nor do they have any units equivalent to the United States Air Force's First Special Operations Wing.

Unable to deliver many amphibious troops, after surrogates, airlift/airborne forces are the Soviet Union's major power projection force. The Soviet Union is also the only country in the Warsaw Pact with a strategic airlift capability. It has 600 tactical transport aircraft configured for airborne operations; and can drop two complete airborne divisions up to 1,000 kilometers or three with fewer vehicles.<sup>35</sup> Aeroflot civil aircraft require a lengthy conversion, but dramatically increase airborne deployment capabilities. However, airborne units will be competing with other activities for airlift. Concomitantly, front-level air-armies do not even have enough dedicated transport aircraft to accomplish large-scale airborne insertions in support of their own operations.

Airlift operations have become increasingly important in Soviet policy, as demonstrated in Egypt and Syria in 1973, Angola in 1975, Ethiopia in 1977-1978, and Afghanistan from 1979-1980. In 1956, the major powers did not believe Khrushchev's threat to intervene during the Suez crisis; but in 1973, the Soviet threat to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict was credible. The VTA fleet has increased dramatically, and the Soviets have begun emphasizing the development of cargo handling and parachute delivery systems, as well as equipment indigenous to airborne units. With an increasing airlift capability, Soviet threats to deploy their airborne are threats to be reckoned.



## Naval Infantry

Naval Infantry receives military training on small group and individual combat. Acting alone, a Marine must make the right decision, quickly analyze new situations, and defeat the enemy. Small unit exercises convert theory into practice.

Their emphasis on independent operations is important because naval infantry are a primary means of power projection. One author writes the main use of naval forces is "to envelop an enemy flank resting against the sea, transferring its units across the sea and to the rear of the hostile enemy...."<sup>36</sup> These desants support independent naval objectives or the ground forces.

A fleet's first objective is to destroy or contain its opposing fleet. Naval infantry missions are manifold in reducing an opposing fleet's effectiveness, particularly by destroying fixed installations, including communications sites and anchored military or merchant shipping. Ports are important targets, particularly in a prolonged conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because destroying them will inhibit North American resupply efforts.


The Soviet naval order-of-battle includes four fleets and four squadrons, as shown in figure three. Some authors attribute one or two naval infantry

regiments to each fleet, while others attribute one or two brigades to each fleet. While none of the squadrons have naval infantry assigned, it must be assumed they could be augmented if the need arose. Naval infantry strength estimates range from a low figure of 12,000 personnel to an unfounded upper extremis of 50,000 personnel.<sup>37</sup> Whatever their number, they are certainly being beefed up to better perform their power projection mission.

The naval infantry receive special training to operate in many environments, and are of a higher calibre (as are the airborne) than troops found in a normal land forces division.

Regardless of their personnel aggregate or the number of brigades deployed at particular locations, the naval infantry is configured to execute conventional missions in support of a fleet or for power projection, and not to accomplish special operations. Just as their airborne counterpart is often confused as SPETSNAZ, so are the naval infantry often mistaken for naval SPETSNAZ.

# FLEETS AND SQUADRONS



CI-UR-1-5/77

## The Commando Company

One author reports the first company of every motorized infantry regiment is a "commando" company (reydovaya rota) with specially trained personnel. Another author corroborates this, noting the first company in many motorized rifle regiments can conduct airmobile "commando" operations, although they are not elements of the airborne forces.<sup>38</sup>

This innovation may be a result of Soviet experience in Afghanistan. However, "commando" is a strictly foreign term and has no Russian derivation.

KOMANDOS (foreign) (comandos) -- Special purpose detachments of the armed forces of Great Britain, intended to conduct reconnaissance-sabotage activities in the enemy rear areas. In the armed forces of the USA such detachments (or subunits) are called "Rangers."<sup>39</sup>

Constantly, western authors vainly attempt to "mirror image" American and Soviet forces. While a company of many motorized rifle regiments may be specially trained to conduct airmobile assaults, they are definitely not called "commandos," nor are they SPETSNAZ.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY

The military aspect of active measures is a more limited concept than the paramilitary element of covert action as understood in the United States. In active measures the military operations are used to mislead or create a false impression of a Soviet military threat to put pressure on a target country (or third parties such as the United States). The purely military aspects of such operations--even if clandestine--are controlled by the appropriate component of the General Staff; the KGB and other agencies involved in active measures may play a supporting role through the use of other active measures techniques.<sup>40</sup>

This limited description, reported by the United States Congress, is indicative only of deception operations and operational security, and completely ignores other active measures, including partisan or special

operations. The KGB role is also summarily discounted, although, it in fact has a directing role, particularly when operations affect more than the immediate tactical battlefield situation. The KGB is asserted to control the GRU and direct its operations, although evidence to the contrary is also available. But the KGB Third Directorate does have veto power over GRU assignments and operations, particularly politically sensitive ones.<sup>41</sup> Nonetheless, general staff organizations, specifically the GRU and subordinate echelons, control important SPETSNAZ assets that conduct special operations.

The Glavnoe razvedyvatelnoe upravlenie sovetskoi armii (GRU) is the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army. In 1920, the Directorate of Intelligence of the Red Army was created from the Cheka Registry Department, which was responsible for collecting military intelligence. The Directorate of Intelligence of the Red Army eventually evolved into the GRU. Until the purges, it probably conducted a better foreign intelligence program than any other Soviet intelligence agency.

The GRU collects strategic, tactical, and technical military intelligence, and conducts industrial espionage and guerrilla warfare. It is divided into three major sections: strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and combat intelligence. It is not responsible for counterintelligence, which is a KGB function.

The GRU is "executive agent" for training "national liberation" movements (probably under KGB direction/oversight), after the political decision to provide support has been made by the International Department with Politburo guidance.

GRU military support to "national liberation" movements, for example, in Angola (where, until recently, they backed the winning group) or Zimbabwe (where they backed the losing group), enhances the Soviet Union's revolutionary credentials. GRU third world activity increased concomitantly with the Soviet's perceived ability and confidence for power projection.

The director of the GRU, or second officer of the general staff, is a general of the army, works for the supreme commander, and controls all reconnaissance and intelligence resources.

As shown in figure four, one author notes the GRU is organized into directorates headed by lieutenant-generals, that the first four directorates control agent networks, and that all intelligence is processed within six information directorates. This author additionally claims the second officer of the general staff controls two worldwide agent networks, vast signals intelligence assets, and diversionary units.<sup>42</sup> Interestingly, pertinent intelligence is immediately passed to appropriate operational commands.

One author identifies the Fifth Directorate's responsibilities as sabotage and diversion, writing:




Figure 4 - The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army (GRU)



The 5th GRU Directorate, which engages in diversion and terroristic activity, has plans not only for immediate crisis points like Berlin. It has complete plans on what buildings should be blown up, who must be assassinated, what must be destroyed in New York, Washington, London, etc. Of course, this is not to be done now, but if and when it becomes necessary, the signals will be given.<sup>43</sup>

However, a recent KGB defector, who revealed Soviet efforts to recruit partisan assets in western Europe in 1972, notes that KGB sabotage teams have national economic and political targets, while GRU SPETSNAZ targets have generally military or related targets.<sup>44</sup> The Fifth Directorate also tasks military attaches to collect information pertaining to its activities and on potential drop zones as they travel in their host countries.

The 5th Directorate is responsible for so-called misinformation activity to confuse the population. Plans have already been made about broadcasts which will go on the air; the leaflets and other types of propaganda materials have already been printed for use in disorienting the populations in the areas where a war or an incident might take place.<sup>45</sup>

Penkovskiy stated the Fifth Directorate was establishing rezidenturas (residencies) in all countries, including socialist ones. It ran a separate agent network, prepared for future airborne landings

in accordance with plans for partisan operations, and trained small groups for specific sabotage tasks. The Fifth Directorate also ran a school near Moscow capable of training 200 "inveterate cutthroats" simultaneously as saboteurs, terrorists, and assassins.

Referring to the school repeatedly, Penkovskiy notes it was Khrushchev's means of removing Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, who was a member of the Presidium. Khrushchev claimed General of the Army Shtemenko formed the school, with Zhukov's knowledge, but failed to inform Khrushchev. However, the author claims the school existed long before Zhukov's dismissal, and that Khrushchev always knew of its existence.

General Shtemenko, who at that time was Chief of the GRU, had organized a sabotage school near Moscow, where about two hundred inveterate cutthroats were being trained as saboteur agents and terrorists. Zhukov knew about this, but had not reported its existence to Khrushchev. At least this is what Khrushchev claimed. Actually, I think the school had been in existence for years.<sup>46</sup>

A recent KGB defector acknowledges a training facility exists about twenty miles from Moscow, but run by the KGB for foreigners, including members of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and other terrorist organizations. He also identified another training facility run by the GRU in Crimea, about 1,000 miles south of

Moscow, but again for foreigners.<sup>47</sup> Penkovskiy reflected women work in the Fifth Directorate, although he doesn't identify their jobs.<sup>48</sup> Interestingly, this is distinctly contrary to American policy.

### The Strategic Direction

A strategic direction usually has four fronts, one fleet, and one group of tank armies, as shown in figure five. A lieutenant-general is the second officer of the staff and commands a reconnaissance directorate that includes a SPETSNAZ long-range reconnaissance regiment. The best one is in the Moscow Military District. "From time to time this regiment goes abroad in full strength. On these occasions it goes under the title of the Combined Olympic Team of the USSR."<sup>49</sup> Whether or not they are the combined olympic team, these regiments are particularly practical if the long-range reconnaissance companies are detached from it in wartime and for exercises, but assembled for training during peacetime. Considering the company's size, a regiment could be no larger than a few hundred, particularly if it is triangular. This organization allows higher-echelon SPETSNAZ to concentrate on deep strategic targets without sapping its strength for tactical missions, which is an endemic problem with the United States' special operations organization. The reconnaissance directorate's organization is similar to the front's reconnaissance directorate.



## The Front or Fleet

A front is usually composed of two-to-three all-arms armies, a tank army, and an air army (figure six). Each of the sixteen military districts (wartime fronts), four groups of forces, and four fleets has a second directorate commanded by a major-general or rear-admiral. The second officer of the front staff has tremendous assets, which Suvorov dubiously describes as equivalent to those of a "large European industrial state."<sup>50</sup> The second directorate or reconnaissance directorate has five departments.

The first department controls all reconnaissance conducted by subordinate armies, including the air army. The second department controls foreign intelligence collection by agents through its intelligence center. During peacetime, it works independently from other Soviet services in foreign countries. The fourth department is for intelligence production, and the fifth for signals intelligence.

The third department supervises diversionary and terrorist activities of all frontal units and its own units. Its resources include a SPETSNAZ diversionary brigade and a SPETSNAZ agent network. This network of indigenous agents is recruited within the front's operational area and is a second, separate agent network for diversionary missions. In addition to the second and third directorate's agent networks, the GRU and the KGB maintain their own, separate agent networks in the same areas.




Figure 6 - The Front

<sup>1</sup>Includes seventy-eight assassination specialists.

<sup>2</sup>Each battalion can form forty-five diversionary groups.

## **The Army**

A colonel commands the second department of an army, which possesses tremendous resources (figure seven). The staff groups correspond to the front's, except there is no second group. The third group for diversionary and terrorist operations controls an independent SPETSNAZ company, but there is no SPETZNAZ diversionary agent network at this echelon.

## **The Divison**

A divison's second department is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel. Unlike American forces, in which divisional intelligence officers (G2) only have operational control over the G2 staff, Soviet divisional intelligence officers (second officers) have operational control of up to 2,500 soldiers for reconnaissance duties, including the reconnaissance battalion; or a reconnaissance company in a naval infantry regiment. The divisional reconnaissance battalion includes a headquarters and headquarters company, two mechanized reconnaissance companies, a motorcycle reconnaissance company, a telecommunications reconnaissance company, and an electronic warfare company (figure eight). But authors contest the number of companies, and one claims there could be a tank company in lieu of one mechanized company, an additional mechanized reconnaissance company, or a long-range reconnaissance company in lieu of the motorcycle reconnaissance company.<sup>51</sup>




Figure 7 - The Army

<sup>1</sup>This company can form fifteen diversionary groups.






Figure 8 - The Division

<sup>1</sup>In lieu of a long-range reconnaissance company, another mechanized reconnaissance company or a motorcycle reconnaissance company could be present.

The long-range reconnaissance company is the lowest SPETSNAZ echelon and the division's smallest company, with only six officers and twenty-one non-commissioned officers assigned. The company headquarters is a commander and sergeant-major, and its five long-range reconnaissance groups each have an officer and four sergeants. A division's best personnel are usually found in the reconnaissance battalion, and that battalion's best personnel can be found within this company. These personnel probably rotate in and out of SPETSNAZ at other echelons and, therefore, probably perform as well as personnel assigned to higher echelons. There is also a long-range reconnaissance company at army and front echelons. One author states they can deploy by any means for reconnaissance, diversionary, sabotage, and terrorist operations. Their equipment includes sound-suppressed weapons, survival gear, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, mines and demolitions, passive night vision devices, radio direction finding, and intercept equipment. SPETSNAZ Long-range reconnaissance company personnel are capable of all special operations missions, and concomitantly, other reconnaissance formations perform only normal reconnaissance functions for their respective units.

## CHAPTER IV

### SPETSNAZ UNITS

Despite the confusion caused by numerous authors, there is only one special operations unit, SPETSNAZ brigada (brigades), which are airborne or naval oriented and uniformed, although they are not connected with naval or airborne forces. While SPETSNAZ brigada are attached to various echelons, they are centralized under the GRU, and ultimately controlled by the KGB as well.

The missions of SPETSNAZ brigada include reconnaissance behind enemy lines, pathfinding, sabotage and disruption, the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, assassination, kidnapping, partisan operations, creating chaos in the enemy's rear (for example, operating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries' uniforms), and other required operations in the enemy's rear. They have no heavy equipment, and operate more clandestinely than the airborne forces or naval infantry. One author describes SPETSNAZ as one of seven arms of the Soviet ground forces.

However, current Soviet doctrine only provides for five: motorized rifle forces, armored forces, airborne forces, rocket troops and artillery, and air defense. Naval forces are also divided into branches: submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal rockets and artillery, and the naval infantry, although this author counts SPETSNAZ as a sixth.

The Soviet Manchurian campaign during the Second World War's closing days is perhaps their most exemplary special operation. The Soviet Pacific theater commander deployed against strategic targets twenty airborne assault teams, of thirty-five-to-forty personnel, drawn from a special 600 personnel unit. The groups were dropped near the Central Manchurian cities of Harbin, Mukden, Chanchun, in Port Arthur on the Lyodun peninsula, and in North Korea to conduct raiding, disruption, and sabotage against strategic, military, and industrial targets. Concomitantly, fast motor torpedo boats deployed small SCUBA or boat teams to sabotage North Korean ports. Although these units caused little destruction in Manchuria, they created panic among Japanese military authorities, increasing the shock effect of the Soviet's surprise attack.<sup>52</sup>

One author claims there are now about 150 SPETSNAZ units dedicated against western Europe in the event of hostilities, and that some even use "atomic land mines."<sup>53</sup> SPETSNAZ personnel's individual skills generally include multiple specialties, foreign language training, parachute training, rigorous physical training, unarmed combat, small-unit operations, terror tactics, reconnaissance techniques, sabotage techniques, demolitions,

guerrilla warfare, clandestine communications, survival, and broad weapons training (including sound-suppressed and special weapons). During unit training, the Soviets emphasize absolute secrecy, detailed planning and coordination, unity of command, resupply from enemy stocks, detailed targeting, destruction methods, secure communications, wearing of foreign uniforms, using indigenous transportation, and utilizing realistic mock-ups of key targets.

SPETSNAZ usually deploy in small teams commanded by an officer fluent in the language spoken in their area of operations, have a senior sergeant as the executive officer, and also include communications, weapons, and demolitions personnel.<sup>54</sup> Another author reports they are deployed in eight-to-ten personnel platoons commanded by a western-language speaking officer, with a senior sergeant as executive officer, and include communications and demolitions non-commissioned officers. The other platoon members are trained to assume the communications or demolitions duties.<sup>55</sup>

After an intensive, extremely physical two-months course, the number of recruits required are selected and the remainder returned to their units. The selectees receive training in communications, demolitions, unarmed combat, methods of entry, survival, and parachute or SCUBA training.

SPETSNAZ brigada soldiers are politically reliable, have served previously for two-to-three years in airborne units, are all volunteers, train in agent-handling and in North Atlantic Treaty Organization uniforms, are

taught the habits, customs, and languages of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and armies, and have a long-term cadre.

SPETSNAZ troops' technical proficiency is probably at least par with similar troops of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization country. One author writes they employ burst communications and highly developed parachuting techniques. He notes they use a radio

receiver which emitted a homing signal in...earphones when... a paratrooper ...faced the transmitter so that the group could assemble as quickly as possible on landing (in this case, the transmitter was in a container that had been dropped with skis required for the mission).<sup>56</sup>

SPETSNAZ brigada are regimental size or smaller, and report to the GRU. Brigada, however, unlike western brigades, generally have only 200-700 personnel. Neuruppin's brigada is larger to fulfill it's Warsaw Pact mission.

One author claims each front (peacetime military districts) has a SPETSNAZ brigada with a headquarters company and three battalions. Each battalion forms up to forty-five diversionary groups or 135 total. Interestingly, a previous author claimed there were at least 150 SPETSNAZ groups targeted against western Europe, which corresponds with the unusually large brigada at Neuruppin.<sup>57</sup> However, instead of deploying in

groups, brigada can operate against one target at full strength; for example, a nuclear submarine base, large headquarters, or a national capital.

On the outbreak of war in Europe a GRU sabotage unit would use an atomic explosion to destroy the mountainous banks of the Rhine and dam it. As a result, Soviet military experts have calculated, some 300-500 kms of West Germany would be flooded, cutting roads, communications and destroying a number of important targets.<sup>58</sup>

One author claims brigada headquarters contain seventy-eight specialists, who perform the most sensitive missions (for example, assassinations), which many members of the brigade are not even aware exists. In peace, this company is concealed within sports teams of military districts. As athletes, they can travel abroad to their potential areas of operations.<sup>59</sup>

Another author states brigada osobogo naznacheniya (another hybrid designation) or "commando-diversion" brigades have three-to-four battalions with companies of fifty-to-one hundred personnel, depending upon their mission. This author assumes one battalion will be assigned to each Soviet army in wartime. This unit is quite similar to a SPETSNAZ company.

The previous author claims each all-arms or tank army has one SPETSNAZ company with 115 personnel, including nine officers and eleven ensigns.<sup>60</sup>


Operating 100-500 kilometers behind the forward-line-of-troops, they typically infiltrate prior to major thrusts and operate ahead of the advancing army. It includes a headquarters, communications platoon, and three SPETSNAZ platoons that can form fifteen SPETSNAZ groups. It appears this company is attached to all-arms or tank armies when necessary, and centralized at other times.

According to one author, each fleet has its own SPETSNAZ brigada. They are under the direct command of the third department of the intelligence directorate at naval headquarters. This author claims they are an independent arm of the service and an independent combat unit in the fleet.<sup>61</sup> In addition to sometimes wearing naval infantry uniforms, their parachutists wear naval aviation uniforms, mini-submarine crews those of ordinary submarine crews, and the remainder those of sea-going personnel--all for the purpose of concealment. During peacetime, they are dispersed between several bases.

Their tactical missions include reconnaissance of landing areas, the detection of mine barriers, attacking berthed ships, and attacking ground targets not more than five kilometers inland. Strategically, their missions are the same as those mentioned earlier, although they would primarily deploy against enemy naval installations, especially nuclear submarine bases.

This brigade, shown in figure nine, includes a miniature submarine division, two or three SCUBA battalions, an airborne battalion, and a signal company."<sup>62</sup> They can use many means of delivery, including large fishing trawlers, to launch and support mini-submarine operations or small special warfare craft.





**Figure 9 - The Naval SPETSNAZ Brigade**

<sup>1</sup> Includes seventy-eight assassination specialists.

Another author writes of Pyatisoty otryad, or the 500th Detachment, which has a mission of sabotaging major ports, and is based on the southern coast of Crimea near Feodosia. Recruited from regular soldiers and officers, its personnel's training includes SCUBA and light underwater vehicle operations, submarine-operations, atomic landmine and other special weapons operations, forward observation for naval gunfire, and parachuting into water.<sup>63</sup> This author claims they have parachutes that dissolve upon contact with salt water. The detachment is remarkably similar to the first author's suggestions, and perhaps, the 500th detachment is the numerical designation of a naval SPETSNAZ unit.

There is one long-range reconnaissance regiment (2,000-2,500 strong) in each of the three strategic directions (western, southwestern, and far eastern). This allows a maximum strength of 7,500 personnel or a minimum of 6,000 personnel. The number of Soviet fronts is estimated at twenty, one for each of the sixteen districts and four among the groups of forces. But only fourteen probably have SPETSNAZ brigada, because every front is allocated an artillery division, of which there are only fourteen. Only fronts at full strength would have a SPETSNAZ brigada. At a maximum strength of 1,200 personnel per SPETSNAZ brigada per front, this allows for a maximum of 16,800 SPETSNAZ personnel, and a minimum of 12,600 personnel. Each of the four fleets also has a SPETSNAZ brigada of 900-1200 personnel. This allows for a minimum of 3,600 and a maximum of 4,800 personnel. There are also four naval squadrons, but it is not known if they have indigenous SPETSNAZ assets.

There are thirteen army staffs within the Soviet Union and nine more among the groups of forces. An additional eighteen can be raised from the sixteen military districts and two corps' (at Vyborg and Arkhangel'sk). However, only existing army staffs probably have indigenous SPETSNAZ companies of 115 personnel. This provides for 2,530 SPETSNAZ personnel assigned to armies, if all twenty-two have an attached SPETSNAZ company.

Determining how many divisions have a long range reconnaissance company of twenty-seven personnel is complicated. Of the forty-six tank divisions, 126 motorized rifle divisions, and eight airborne divisions, only seventy-three are probably category one or two, and the remainder category three. Category one is seventy-five to one hundred percent strength with all assigned equipment; category two is fifty to seventy-five percent strength with assigned fighting vehicles; and category three twenty-five percent strength, possibly with obsolescent fighting vehicles. Divisions in east Europe and airborne divisions are category one, twenty-five percent of those in the eastern and far eastern Soviet Union are category one or two, and the remainder are category three. Certainly, the divisions in Afghanistan and probably Mongolia are also category one. Assuming only category one or two divisions have a long-range reconnaissance company, that provides for 1,971 personnel.

These calculations indicate a minimum of ±26,701 and a maximum of ±33,601 SPETSNAZ personnel in all echelons through the strategic direction. It does

not include GRU headquarters units or KGB personnel. Furthermore, the figures will obviously decline or increase depending upon the number of fronts and armies attributed with SPETSNAZ units.

### **The SPETSNAZ Agent Network**

There is a common misconception within western intelligence agencies, because of their own operating methods, that all intelligence agencies maintain multi-purpose agent networks. The Soviets, however, do not subscribe to this axiom, although the west applies it to the Soviets. The Soviets not only run an agent network for foreign intelligence collection, but they also run a completely compartmented SPETSNAZ agent network. Nikolay Khokhlov, a former partisan and Department V officer who defected during a 1954 assassination mission in the Federal Republic of Germany, stated the MGB used Second World War SPETSNAZ personnel to establish a special operations agent network to target American military installations. During the Second World War, a behind-the-lines infrastructure was necessary to conduct operations, and the Soviets still consider a similar infrastructure necessary to conduct modern special operations against North Atlantic Treaty Organization targets. During peacetime, KGB and GRU officers and agents provide target intelligence to strategic, operational, and tactical commanders. Combined with airborne or satellite imaging and signals intelligence collection, they eliminate the need for forward area reconnaissance by ground forces prior to hostilities.

Although some SPETSNAZ agents are active, the vast majority are zamorozhennye (frozen) or sleeper agents. One author claims the GRU recruits them from potential enemy's armed forces.<sup>64</sup> They are trained in sabotage, particularly of nuclear - capable units, and to interrupt communications. Potential recruits include military personnel, and depending upon their access, civilians living in the vicinity of targets.

...Senior Lieutenant Valentin Yerikalin, of the SPETSNAZ brigade of the Black Sea Fleet,...won a silver medal for rowing at the Olympic Games held in Mexico City.... Some years later this "sportsman" turned up in Istanbul, having now become a diplomat. He was arrested by the Turkish police for trying to recruit a Turkish subject to work for the Black Sea Fleet, or, more precisely, for the diversionary brigade of this Fleet.<sup>65</sup>

Because SPETSNAZ agents generally do not perform peacetime missions, they are difficult to detect. Caches are planted for them in proximity to their domiciles, they receive instruction on various weapons, and only initiate preplanned missions in the event of war.

There are SPETSNAZ agent networks down to the front echelons. One author asserts the Soviet's primary targets are North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, and estimates there are minimally 8,000 active (contradicting his earlier statement there are few active agents) and 5,000 "frozen" agents in the Federal Republic of Germany alone.<sup>66</sup> Neutral European countries and the United States are also targets.

## CHAPTER V

### THE COMMUNIST AND STATE SECURITY ORGANS

#### International Department

The International Department, with approximately 200 personnel, coordinates aktivnyye meropriyatiya or active measures, controls all international front organizations, foreign nonruling communist parties, surrogates, foreign socialist parties, and "liberation movements" supported by the Soviet Union (figure ten). Its goal in supporting these organizations is to carry out political, economic, or military action and propaganda campaigns to further Soviet goals and the international communist movement. The Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security or KGB) is its tool for implementing its directives. The International Department is the "brains" and the KGB the "executive agent" in executing active measures.

#### The State Security Organs

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) was established in 1917 and the Vse-rossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya po borbe s




Figure 10 - The Communist Party of the Soviet Union Organization for Active Measures

<sup>1</sup> Every unit in the Armed forces, including the MVD and the border guards, has an OO. Its size proportionately corresponds to the unit it is surveilling. The OO structure is parallel to everything depicted in every other unit diagram from the Ministry of Defense down.

<sup>2</sup> Works Directly Abroad.

kontrrevolisiey i sabotazhem (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage) or Cheka (linchpin in Russian) as it was more commonly known, was established in December 1917. Under F. E. "Iron Felix" Dzerzhinskiy, the Cheka not only performed intelligence and security functions, it established its own armed forces, assumed responsibility for guarding the Soviet frontiers, and established special sections for counterintelligence in the regular armed forces.

The Cheka used mass terror in the early years of the Soviet state, which Dzerzhinskiy institutionalized as a deliberate party policy, to consolidate and later to preserve the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's power. The Cheka's use of mass terror stemmed from Lenin's belief "that their dictatorship must be based 'directly on force.'"<sup>67</sup> The Cheka was reincarnated as the GPU (State Political Directorate), under the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), until the federation of the Soviet republics in November 1923, when the GPU became the OGPU (Unified...), subordinate to the Council of People's Commissariats. In July 1934, it became the GUGB (Chief Directorate for State Security) and part of the NKVD, which had been abolished in 1930 and reestablished in 1934.

The NKVD controlled the secret police, police, border guards, internal troops, concentration and labor camps, and conducted other less-sinister activities in the public sector, blurring the public distinctions between its activities. In 1941, the GUGB became the NKGB (People's Commissariat for State Security). Smert shpionam (SMERSH or Death to Spies) was created during



the Second World War and commanded by Lieutenant General V. S. Abakumov, who headed the MGB, (Ministry for State Security) and created the KI (Committee of Information) by combining the MGB foreign sections, portions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the GRU. The KI acted independently and was responsible for foreign intelligence operations. In 1946, the NKGB was absorbed by the MGB and the NKVD by the MVD (Ministry for Internal Affairs). The GRU was resurrected in 1948, and in 1951 the KI was abolished, its responsibilities reverting to the MGB. After Stalin's death in March 1953, the MGB merged into the MVD, and on 13 March 1954, the KGB was created and assigned political police functions and other duties congruent to the GRU's and MVD's.

Although the overall state security organs have evolved considerably, their branches have remained relatively similar, often retaining their designations and functions.

#### **Service A, First Chief Directorate**

The responsibility for political deception planning or disinformation lies within the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Dezinformatsiya or disinformation can include physical acts calculated to have a psychological effect on a specific audience as well as simply the distribution of false

information (which may be extremely complicated to prepare) to evoke or provoke a desired response. It is clandestine because its true origin is concealed and it is often achieved through agents of influence. Disinformation techniques against the enemy concerning plans and activities of Soviet forces played a large role in the security officers' struggle against Hitlerite intelligence agents.

Disinformation is a keen weapon when fighting the enemy. It requires an original approach, clear thinking and precise calculations. Most important here is that the enemy believe the information being fed to him.<sup>68</sup>

Political deception is non-military action to influence while military deception is military action to influence or mislead. Military deception operations, or maskirovka, can include special operations.

Department D of the First Chief Directorate was created in 1959 to supervise disinformation activities. It became Department A in 1969, and was elevated to Sluzhba aktivnykh meropriyatiy, or Service A in 1970. Disinformation was also an activity of SMERSH, or what has now become the KGB's Third Directorate; and the GRU's 5th Directorate.

An active measure or entire active measures campaign can originate anywhere within the Soviet hierarchy, from a residency abroad to the Politburo. But once the Politburo approves it, Service A, often in

conjunction with the International Department, drafts the plan and supervises its implementation. Service A keeps track of disinformation programs, maintains records of activities of agents of influence, and evaluates all active measures. Service A gets "the best and the brightest" and has doubled in size in the last ten years, although it only has 200 personnel. Service A's rapid growth indicates the division's importance and the KGB's increasing reliance upon active measures as a means of expanding Soviet influence. This is perfectly in line with Moscow's developing power projection doctrine.

Service A uses Soviet KGB residencies to direct operations abroad. It often directly or indirectly supports terrorists and insurgencies. However, it never has its hand on the "smoking gun." KGB Line PR officers have primary responsibility for collecting political intelligence and conducting active measures. They are assigned to the geographic departments and manage agents of influence and other agents, conduct penetrations, etc.

#### **Directorate S, Department 8, First Chief Directorate**

The NKVD organized the Administration of Special Tasks in 1936. It was also known as mokryye dela or the "blood-wet affairs" department. Among its better known operations are arranging the 1940 assassination of Leon Trotsky

in Mexico; murdering white Russian General Aleksandr P. Kutepov in Paris in 1930 (prior to its formal establishment); murdering GRU General Walter Krivitsky; and attempting to murder General Walter Orlov. Their original task was the assassination of Russian emigres and dissident communists. After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, it became the Fourth (Partisan) General Directorate (Chetvertoye upravleniye) of the NKVD. It was responsible for espionage, assassination, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. To this day, the KGB does not have a Fourth Chief Directorate, perhaps in deference to the tradition of the Second World War NKGB Partisan Directorate.

After 1945, the Fourth (Partisan) Directorate of the NKVD was renamed spets otdel or special section. Between 1945-1950, they conducted an active campaign to kidnap, among their thousands of targets, German scientists and Russian emigres. Its mission included, as before, assassinations, kidnapping, and special operations in Europe.

In June 1946, it became Special Bureau (Spetsburo) Number 1 of the NKGB, but its mission was still terror, assassination, and abduction. Actual abductions ordinarily were carried out by thugs the Russians termed boyevaya gruppa or combat groups, supervised by Soviet officers. But Soviet officers also conducted abductions, as well as assassinations. The expressed purpose of Spetsburo Number 1 was to train for future partisan warfare, but its real purpose was "diversional activities and terroristic work for the Soviet benefit abroad."<sup>69</sup> Khokhlov defined "terroristic" as murder and

assassination; and "diversionary" as subversion and sabotage. Lieutenant General Pavel A. Sudoplatov was its chief and Major General Eitington its deputy. In contrast, most other sections were commanded by senior colonels. Sudoplatov also reported directly to the Chief of State Security.

An excellent example of the Spetsburo's activities was the kidnapping of Walter Linse and the subsequent complicity of the highest authority in the Soviet Union. Linse was kidnapped on 8 July 1952 at approximately 0700 in West Berlin. On 9 June 1960, the Soviets ostensibly admitted one of the most brazen kidnappings of the cold war, when the Soviet Red Cross announced Walter Linse died in a Soviet prison on 15 December 1953. Linse chaired the economics department of the Free Jurists Investigative Committee, a West Berlin-based organization that collected intelligence on the Soviet Union. He was dragged into an automobile by thugs outside of his home on 8 July 1952, and sped into East Berlin at over 100 miles per hour. Washington immediately charged Moscow with the kidnapping, which it denied. An American official, bitterly recalling the Soviet denials, commented "The virtual Soviet admission they kidnapped Linse is a good commentary on Premier (Nikita S.) Khrushchev's statement at the Paris summit that 'as God is my witness my soul is pure and my hands are clean.'"70 Moscow's admission Linse had been in the Soviet Union proved their responsibility for the kidnapping.

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev became worried about the Spetsburo's power, and closed it in June 1953. He later reversed that decision, concluding that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union needed such an organization to maintain power, and reorganized it in September 1953 as the Ninth Section or Ninth Department-Otdel, First Chief Directorate. Khokhlov identified it as the Ninth Section for Terror and Diversion (Devyaty otel po terroru i diversii) of the MVD, created in July 1953, and commanded by Colonel Studnikov, and his deputy, Colonel E. I. Mirkovski. The Ninth Section reported to the Second Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate (Vtoroye upravleniye), and no longer reported to the Minister of State Security. Interestingly, the chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the MGB (later First Chief Directorate, KGB), A. S. Panyushkin, to whom the Ninth Section directly reported, was a former ambassador to the United States.

On 18 February 1954, Captain Nikolay Khokhlov (a former partisan and Department V officer) defected, rather than assassinate Georgi Okolovich (a key leader of the Union of Russian Solidarists, an anti-communist emigre group) in October. In his testimony, Khokhlov stated the assassination order had come from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and had been signed by Nikita Khrushchev and Georgi Malenkov. He announced they had long waged a campaign against anti-communist emigres, particularly members of the Union of Russian Solidarists and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Following is an excerpt from his testimony before the United States Congress:

MR KHOKHLOV. Throughout the period of my work in the intelligence service, I received altogether three assignments as to the assassination of people.

The first one was the assignment to assassinate, to kill, a German gauleiter kube who was executing people in western Byelorussia in 1943. This was the wartime. I was a soldier then, just as much as anybody who fought at the front. I knew that it was my duty to kill this person, just as much as my friends were killing Germans at the front.

I put on a uniform of a German officer, and I was transported behind the lines of the front. In the uniform of the German officer, I penetrated Minsk which was occupied by the Germans. I found people who could carry out the matter of killing of kube....

And kube was killed....<sup>71</sup>

Khokhlov also testified that part of the Ninth Section included laboratories to support assassination requirements. Laboratory 12 made poison compounds. Laboratory 13 made silent weapons, including a cigarette case pistol with poison ammunition.

In 1954, with the formation of the KGB, the Ninth Section became Department 13 of Line F, First Chief Directorate. Still responsible for abduction and assassination, on 12 October 1957, Lev Rebet was assassinated by one of its officers in West Berlin. Steven Bandera, another leading anti-communist emigre, was assassinated in a similar fashion on 15 October 1959 by a prussic acid pellet-firing weapon. It was a deadly but effective weapon of which all traces disappear almost immediately. For these assassinations, Bogdan Stashynsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Presidium on 6 November 1959. It was presented by KGB Chairman Shelepin (later a member of the Presidium, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The order for the award was signed by Voroshilov, then the Chairman of the Presidium.

On 12 August 1961, Stashynsky and his wife Inge defected, one day prior to the Berlin wall's construction. He was sentenced to eight years in a much celebrated case, released in 1966, and received a new identity. Prior to his defection, Stashinsky was laying the groundwork for the assassination of Jaroslaw Stetzko, the Prime Minister of the Ukraine in 1941, and then Prime Minister of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Munich. Stetzko was regarded as next to importance after Bandera, but due to Stashinsky's defection and the attention drawn to Rebet and Bandera's assassinations, Stetzko's murder was never accomplished.



While the KGB conducts most forms active measures, its SPETSNAZ are principally responsible for covert operations, or operations the Soviets do not wish to be publicly associated with, such as terrorism. The KGB, during peace or war, is responsible for overall sabotage planning and coordination. KGB SPETSNAZ, who are independent form the GRU, even in wartime, target civilian populations to create panic, disrupt government, and destroy public utilities and key production facilities that affect a nation. These units would probably deploy prior to hostilities and live as "illegals" until they exfiltrate, making it likely they are assigned to Directorate S, Department 8, First Chief Directorate. KGB SPETSNAZ are composed of KGB officers with years of training and broad experience. In addition to their vast experience in special operations methodology, these officers are steeped in the cultural, historical, political, and popular customs of their target countries. They train in special and extensive areas that mimic typical western towns "where the men can drink the local beer, wine, etc. and listen to appropriate music."<sup>72</sup>

One author asserts these units intend to spread diseases such as cholera and typhoid prior to hostilities, use chemical and nuclear weapons, and cause forest fires, etc.<sup>73</sup> Evidence of Soviet chemical warfare throughout Asia and in Eritrea is conclusive, and validated not only by the United States, but independently by Canada, Great Britain, Australia, the People's Republic of China, Thailand, and France, lending credence to this author's claim. They also maintain "hit lists," targets under constant surveillance, and note all situational changes.

Lyalin's 1972 defection from the KGB compromised the Soviet effort to recruit partisan assets in western Europe. Deriabin, another defector, testifies that Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow had a KGB staff officer, Colonel Yerzin, as its prorector or deputy director, and that it combines a free education with insurgent cadre training for third-world nationals."<sup>74</sup>

Deriabin also stated that Department 13 had a Ninth Section which was responsible for terrorist and diversionary activities. He defined the terrorist mission as assassination or murder, and described diversionary activities as preparing or organizing the demolition, arson or sabotage by other means of strategic targets; or in major population centers to create panic.<sup>75</sup>

The KGB, for example, controls the clandestine activities of sabotage cells in France, particularly Paris, and in the event of war, will attempt to disorganize or neutralize the government and deterrent forces. It is contended there are probably enough of these cells to present a threat, and they could gain control of peripheral governmental activities, eroding its power and effectiveness. Then, after gaining a certain degree of control, and rivaling the government, they will be able to blackmail the government through demonstrations with popular support, and because of general disorder, delay its decision to issue orders for nuclear retaliation. The ultimate goal of the "guerre du refus" is really to prevent the attacked nation from effective decisionmaking and to neutralize the nuclear deterrent capability,

culminating in an actual takeover of government functions by high-ranking communist party members. This can all occur in the densely populated Parisian capital before any major engagement or nuclear exchange occurs.<sup>76</sup>

Nikolay Khokhlov, whose mission was to assassinate G. S. Okolovich (a well known anti-communist Russian emigre leader and Union of Russian Solidarists official) in Munich, instead defected and before the United States Congress

testified that in 1952 his superior in the 13th Department one Mirkovskiy declared, "Remember, you're going for combat work--c-o-m-b-a-t. Blow up military warehouses, explosions in shops, sabotage in arms factories, and, if necessary, the physical liquidation of our enemies. At any place, by any means."<sup>77</sup>

During the mid-1960's, Department 13 shifted its operational emphasis from assassination to preparations for sabotage. KGB sabotage efforts then concentrated on preparations for coordinated sabotage operations, which was a Department 13 responsibility, in conjunction with an active measures campaign to paralyze a nation's will and responses, short of war, to an international crisis; and not only on fifth column or "frozen" agent activities in the event of hostilities.

Department 13 became Department V, the Executive Action Department, in the 1968-1969 KGB reorganization. It was still responsible for political murders, sabotage, and kidnapping; and still ran agent networks that included illegals. It had a headquarters staff, and personnel assigned to most major embassies.

During the 1970s, the previously independent Department V was absorbed by Directorate S, First Chief Directorate, and became known as Department 8, while maintaining its terrorism, assassination, kidnapping, and sabotage missions. Department 8 runs a training school at Balshikha, and its diversionary specialists are probably located there. Levchenko confirms their main functions as recruiting foreigners for sabotage, assassination, etc., and deploying illegals abroad to await hostilities.<sup>78</sup>

The following activities were part of a Soviet active measures campaign run by Service A with participation by Department 8.<sup>79</sup> Its purpose was to destabilize Iran with the aim of bringing it under Soviet hegemony, all while the Iranians publicly denounced the Soviet Union as "a devil state," etc.

Initially in Iran, foreign intelligence collection was conducted by the KGB and the GRU, bolstered by numerous illegals drawn from Soviet Farsi-speakers, Afghan refugees, and the KGB-controlled Afghan intelligence service, Estekbarat. Collection was also accomplished through cover organizations, such as the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society or the Russian Hospital in Tehran, which provided inexpensive medical care to Iranians.

The KGB and GRU recruited quite successfully, particularly within the military. Their agents included Major General Ahmad Mogharrabi, the Deputy Chief of Planning and Logistics of the Imperial Iranian Army, and Ali Naghi Rabbani, a member of the prime minister's office. These two agents, for example, were trained in the Soviet Union to employ very sophisticated communications devices.

International and domestic propaganda activities conducted by the Soviets were intense. The KGB engaged in covert publishing through a professionally produced weekly publication entitled Navid, which blatantly conveyed Soviet disinformation themes. If necessary, they could print special editions immediately, and their press was probably located in the Soviet embassy basement.

The International Department supported the Tudeh (Communist Party of Iran) and terrorist organizations in Iran. The Mujahedeen of the People of Iran was also backed indirectly by the Soviet Union through Libya. Their operations included the assassinations of Colonel Hawkins on 3 June 1973, and Colonels Turner and Shaefer on 21 May 1975, all United States military advisors; and the bombing of American corporate factories between June-July 1974. The Soviets also supported the very active People's Fedayeen, who assassinated the Mashad police chief on 1 October 1978. These terrorists received training in Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Cuba, Palestine Liberation Organization camps in Lebanon, and Iraq (until the 1978

communist purge). In Afghanistan, for example, the Soviets continue to supervise guerrilla warfare training for recruits from Iran, Arab countries, and Baluchistan in two camps in Mazar-e Sharif.

Finally, many international groups conducted propaganda campaigns indirectly funded by a Soviet surrogate, Libya, including the Iranian Students Association, the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran, and the Transnational Institute (an international subsidiary of the Institute for Policy Studies, a Washington-based "think-tank" which may be connected with the Cuban Direccion General De Inteligencia).

The USSR also provided massive assistance projects to Iran, either directly or through its surrogates. Since 1981, more than 3,000 Soviets advised in Iran on these projects. Many of these projects, particularly those involving transportation, could not be run without Soviet assistance. The number of KGB agents involved are believed to run as high as fifty percent on some projects. But they are generally not SPETSNAZ. Additionally, SAVAMA, SAVAK's successor, is believed to have a training school run by over thirty KGB officers, in cooperation with approximately 600 Palestine Liberation Organization agents in the Iranian government.

The Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian Revolutionary Party's military arm, had approximately 10,000 members armed and trained under Palestine Liberation Organization auspices in Lebanon by Soviet and Czech officers prior to the

Shah's departure. In 1981, 100 Iranian officers, and in 1982, 500 more went to the Soviet Union for training, while 100 pilots went to the German Democratic Republic and North Korea. The Soviets also supply military equipment, weapons, and supplies through Libyan, North Korean, and Syrian surrogates.

The USSR continues to aid Iranian minorities, as it has since the early 1920s. Recently, the Soviets expanded their covert aid to Sistani nationalists in eastern Iran, to prevent support of Afghan rebels from this region. They are also probably planning future operations in Iranian Azerbaijan. Central Committee member Geider Aliyev, the Mostem Protege of the late Secretary Yu. V. Andropov, has publicly announced Moscow's desire to unite Iranian Azerbaijan with its Soviet counterpart in his lifetime. Interestingly, Soviet Azerbaijan has only been Soviet for about 150 years, before which the Russians violently wrested it from Iran.

The Soviets also provide covert aid to Baluch tribesmen, in Iranian Baluchistan, where there are approximately 200 Soviet advisors, who are probably GRU SPETSNAZ personnel, and thirty East German advisors. Meanwhile, in this region, the Soviets are rebuilding the Chah Bahar naval base and Konarak air base at the Persian Gulf's mouth. The Soviet Union constantly overflies the area and also has tacit approval to operate a listening post on the Pakistani border.

### The Third (Armed Forces) Chief Directorate

The Osobyi otel (OO or special sections) of the KGB are responsible for security and counterintelligence in the armed forces, including the MVD and border guards, and can trace their existence directly to Lenin. In the wake of the revolution, all army counterintelligence units were attached to the Cheka's Registry Department. When the Red Army was finally formed in January 1918, the Cheka was empowered to "eliminate" hostile tsarist officers, since tsarist officers were allowed to serve as the professional cadre of the Red Army.

The Russian civil war western front's Extraordinary Commission lead to the creation of the Cheka agencies in the Soviet armed forces. The 16 July 1918 Sovnarkom resolution promulgating these agencies is considered the origin of Soviet military counterintelligence. In addition to the other extraordinary commissions formed on all fronts, a military subsection of the VCHK was formed to supervise them, which later became the military department of the VCHK. Many Red Army tsarist officers were suspected of still being loyal to, for example, Kolchak or Dennikin, and that it was the Cheka's responsibility to ferret them out, thus causing the basis for suspicion among the professional military that exists until this day.



However, their duties were much more pervasive than "mere" counterintelligence, and included law enforcement, judging the political reliability of orders, the accomplishment of political and military special operations, etc. The Soviet gold reserve, for example, was captured by white forces in August 1918 in Kazan, and after its recapture, its return was entrusted to Kosukin, a member of a special section. The journey to safety was fraught with danger from bandits, the white armies, and a destroyed railroad, and is the "stuff" movies depict. The special sections were also responsible for the Red Army's doctor draft, inspecting Red Army medical and sanitary facilities, controlling weapons, and apprehending and administering deserters and "draft" evaders.

The earliest instance of any reference to SPETSNAZ was during an uprising led by A. S. Antonov from 1919 to 1921 around Tambov. The uprising was put down by M. N. Tukhachevskiy and Antonov was killed in combat with a Chekist combat detachment. In the Nizhnyy Spasskiy forest, twenty-five kilometers from Tambov, Matyukhin (an associate of Antonov's) and his staff were ambushed by a special section cavalry squadron, another SPETSNAZ predecessor. During the actions against Antonov, the engaged special section even had operational control of a brigade during an operation in July 1921 against one of the largest and best armed guerrilla formations.

Special sections' missions were combatting counter-revolution, corruption, and espionage in the Red Army and Navy, combatting popular counter-revolutionary activity and bandit uprisings, and conducting special operations; further bolstering the contention these units are the historical

predecessors of SPETSNAZ. The special sections were also given responsibility for guarding the borders, which they had been doing since the civil war, until the Main Directorate of the Border Guard of the OGPU was created in 1926.

After the end of the Civil War, the basic centers of Russian counterrevolution were outside the borders of the Soviet state....The Cheka and OGPU units, including the special sections, devoted much effort toward suppressing the subversive activity of the various white emigrant organizations formed in the West and to conduct Chekist operations [active measures], including assassinations directed toward limitation of their anti-Soviet activity and internal subversion of them. In particular, military counter-intelligence agents of those years actively participated in operations to defeat the band of Savinkov's "Union for the Defense of the Homeland and Freedom" sent from abroad and to bring Savinkov himself to Soviet territory [a euphemism for assassinating or kidnapping him].<sup>80</sup>

The special section eventually abducted Savinkov, returned him to Moscow, tried him in August 1924, sentenced him to death, and commuted his sentence to ten years imprisonment. He committed "suicide" in May 1925.

A similar operation, the infamous "Trust" operation, of which much can be found in the literature of espionage, was conducted by a special section in Paris against the Vysshego monarkhicheskiy sovet or Supreme Monarchist

Council. Its purpose was to reduce anti-Soviet activity and intimidate Russian emigrants. This operation lasted for six years, until the Council ceased to exist in April 1927.

A "Special Far Eastern Army" was used by the Soviets in an attempt to capture the Soviet owned Chinese-Eastern Railroad in the summer of 1929. It is not clear whether this was entirely a special section unit or a unit that was formed specifically for the task of repulsing the railroad attack. While the latter seems most likely, this army's operations certainly indicate that some of its echelons were also SPETSNAZ predecessors.

The Chekists of the Special Far Eastern Army participated directly in carrying out army combat missions, and in a number of cases acted courageously in the enemy rear.

For example, the operational worker of an Army Special Section Georgiy Kas'yanovich Voyevoda, on instructions from the command, formed a combat group consisting of former Far Eastern partisans in the area of the Pogranichnaya Station, and in command of it conducted several skillful raids behind enemy lines in order to paralyze the advance of enemy troops against the eastern section of the Chinese-Eastern railroad.

During these raids, Voyevoda's detachment blew up a railroad bridge in the rear of the White Manchurian forces,

derailed several enemy military trains and disrupted telegraph and telephone communications in a number of important sections. More than once, the detachment had to join battle with enemy groups; a number of important enemy operational documents were captured in one of these. The combat operations of the partisan group of Chekist G. K. Voyevoda helped the Soviet forces to carry out the mission assigned to them with lower losses.<sup>81</sup>

During the 1930's, "as before, the special sections participated actively in general Cheka operations, to detect and liquidate kulak and nationalist formations and bandit groups," in effect, former white guards.<sup>82</sup> After the OGPU became the GUGB, the army and navy special sections remained unchanged, but a military section was created in the NKVD to supervise their work. This unit seems to correspond with Deriabin's U00s. Two authors note that all the Soviet prisoners-of-war returned by the Finns at the conclusion of the 1939-1940 Russo-Finnish War were repatriated to a special section and never heard of again.<sup>83</sup>

The following is just one example of the tensions that existed between the 00s and operational military commanders:

A divisional commander in charge of troops on the Soviet frontier received instructions to study the Polish fortifications and to train his troops in storming them. He

accordingly organized special exercises designed to familiarize his troops with the Polish positions. An agent of the OO in the divisional staff, however, reported that the general designed the maneuvers in such a manner as to reveal Soviet plans to the Poles and to make the Soviet Union appear as an aggressor before the eyes of the world. The general was removed from his command and placed under investigation. It was only thanks to the intervention of a certain marshal that he was finally reinstated.<sup>84</sup>

Although this example is perhaps somewhat dated, special sections remain powerful. Furthermore, SMERSH powers were dramatically expanded during the Second World War.

On 13 April 1943, Nazi Germany announced on German radio the discovery of mass graves of Polish officers at Katyn Forest near Smolensk, and blamed the Russians. On the 15th, Radio Moscow denied the charges. At the time, the initial predilection of the United States and its allies was to believe the Soviets, since they were allies in a world war against the Nazis.

The 10,000-15,000 Polish officers estimated to have been executed were murdered in the Spring of 1940, when the Soviets controlled that territory, and had not yet clashed with the Nazis. All the officers were shot in the back of their cloaked heads, and many had their hands tied. SMERSH

predecessors and special detachments of the NKVD have been blamed for these and other atrocities. All prisoner-of-war matters were an NKVD responsibility. Stalin and Beria were clearly implicated. After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviets decided to raise a Polish army under Soviet command to fight the Nazis. When senior Polish diplomats and officers queried Beria about the missing Polish officers in question, he responded "No, not those in regard to the inability to use them. We made a big mistake concerning them. A grave mistake was made..." "My zdielali oshibkov bolshouiu oshilokou zdielali."<sup>85</sup> The Soviets, of course, had executed them all, possibly drowning whole barge loads of them in the White Sea.

Dr. Roman Martini, the mysteriously assassinated public prosecutor for Krakow, and numerous defectors have corroborated that an NKVD special extermination brigade committed the atrocities, and that the officers in command were Soviet Colonels Ribak, Finberg, Bomsovitch, Kutschov, Sjekanov, and Lisak.<sup>86</sup> This demonstrates a most heinous purpose for what was probably an OSNAZ or SPETSNAZ unit, on a mission that definitely was not a military special operation, at least from an American perspective.

In February 1941, military counterintelligence was transferred from the NKVD to the military and became the Third Office of the National Commissariat of USSR Defense (NKO). A similar office was created in the National Commissariat of the Navy (NKVMF). This system proved too cumbersome, since the third departments were now subordinated to the army or navy and the security service. So in July 1941, the NKVD absorbed the NKGB and the Third

Office of the National Commissariat of USSR Defense, which was renamed the Directorate of Special Departments (OO). The National Commissariat of the Navy Third Department was reorganized into Special Departments (OO) in January 1942. Concomitantly, the Office of Special Divisions of the USSR NKVD (UOO) was created to manage all subordinate levels. Current special section missions remained similar, but outstripped just counterintelligence and security duties.

In August 1941, security officers and agents of the Black Sea Fleet transported by submarine from Sevastopol to an area south of Varna, Bulgaria fourteen Bulgarian representatives of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers Party. They were charged with organizing the partisan warfare campaign against the Nazis in Bulgaria, which they subsequently accomplished. The special section personnel were responsible for leading the operation, its operational security, and the safety of the Bulgarians.

NKVD (later SMERSH) officers received inflated military ranks, adding fuel to the already heated relationship between the security agency and the military commands. The head of the southwestern front's OO, Commissar of State Security (Komissar gosbezopasnosti) A. N. Mikheev, was given the equivalent military rank of colonel general (General-polkovnik). However, only one other individual on the whole southwestern front held the rank of colonel-general, and that was the front commander, Colonel General M. P. Kirponos.

In April 1943, Stalin again transferred the Office of Special Divisions from the NKVD to the National Defense Commissariat of the USSR (GKO) and renamed it Glavnoye upravleniye kontrrazvedki narodnogo komissariata oborony SSSR (GUKR NKO or SMERSH), primarily to unify the defense leadership in the final stages of the war. In the navy, SMERSH was the Directorate of Counterintelligence of the Navy of the USSR. In choosing the name, a popular slogan of the day, Smert'nemetskim shpionam (Death to the German Spies) or "SMERNESH" was originally proposed. However, Stalin suggested:

And why, as a matter of fact, should we be speaking only of German spies? Aren't other intelligence services working against our country? Let's call it "Smert'shpionam" (Death to the spies), abbreviated--"Smersh"...<sup>87</sup>

SMERSH nominally reported to the National Defense Commissariat, but was primarily staffed by NKVD and NKGB officers. Lieutenant General Semonovich Abakumov, the chief of SMERSH and a deputy people's commissar of defense, reported directly to Stalin.

SMERSH officers wore the uniform and insignia of their assigned unit, were not transferred as frequently as other officers, and consequently had the opportunity to get to know the personnel in their units. Among their duties was to recruit informers or seksoty (short for sekretnye sotrudniki or secret collaborators) and conduct executions. The OO and the unit zampolit (deputy for political affairs) coordinated closely. Although in theory it was not, the OO was in fact involved in every facet of unit life and



operations. In addition to insuring the Red Army's loyalty and performing counterintelligence activities in the armed forces, SMERSH also had shock units. There was generally one SMERSH company per division, and they progressively increased in size as echelons increased.

SMERSH'S missions on Soviet territory in World War II included rear area security, deploying "exterminating" detachments (including the one that murdered the Polish officers), deploying retreat-blocking detachments (a July 1942 order by Stalin created these to prevent unauthorized retreats), counterintelligence (including arraignment, sentencing, and execution), guarding Stalin, disinformation, partisan operations, and special operations.

SMERSH officers in special sections assigned directly to partisan groups supervised partisan intelligence collection and counterintelligence missions, and provided a centralized channel of political control over partisan operations in occupied Soviet territory. In occupied areas beyond the pre-war Soviet frontiers, SMERSH missions included counterespionage against Nazi Abwehr and Gestapo agents, and was the means by which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reimposed control in occupied territories and crushed east European national resistance. Additionally, as the war progressed, the SMERSH-partisan relationship facilitated SMERSH efforts to identify and eliminate collaborators in occupied or formerly occupied Soviet territory. They were also responsible for the capture of anti-communists (identified by local communists), and their "extermination" or "deportation".

During an operation to capture a beach-head for a naval infantry brigade landing at the Japanese-occupied North Korean port of Seisin on 13 August 1945, two naval security officers, Captain Nikolai Ivanovich Semin and Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Krygin, were ordered on a secondary mission to capture the Japanese intelligence center in Seisin, intact with documents and personnel, and the chief of the naval mission, Colonel Minodzuma.

The landing team, under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Captain-Lieutenant Leonov was put ashore under fire by eight motor torpedo boats, and captured a beach-head at Seisin. But during the attack, one of the boats landed part of the naval intelligence team and the machine gun company out of position. The machine gun company commander, Sergeant Ushakov, was killed and Security Officer Krygin assumed command. He led twelve successive counterattacks against the Japanese before ordering his remaining force to retreat to the harbor, while covering his command during the withdrawal. Lieutenant Krygin's horribly mutilated body was located after the main naval infantry landing, and he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Captain Semin, the other security officer in the intelligence team, successfully captured the Japanese naval mission, although Colonel Minodzuma alluded capture for several days. Captain Semin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. This mission also confirms that SMERSH officers performed much more than just their counterintelligence duties, and in fact, often commanded operations.

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SPETSMAZ (SPETSIAL'NOYE NAZNACHENIYE): THE SOVIET

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
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
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General Andrey Vlasov led the Nazi-created Committee to Liberate the Peoples of Russia and the Russian Liberation Army. SMERSH conducted an operation to capture General Vlasov while he was attempting to escape to the advancing United States Seventh Army. During his flight, General Vlasov's adjutant and chauffeur, both recruited by SMERSH, stopped his automobile at a predesignated location. SMERSH officers, with an infantry unit in support, captured General Vlasov and transported him in a tank to Dresden, where the command point of the First Ukrainian Front was located. From there he was flown to Moscow, where he was executed.

A very large formation of the 00, the security parachute division of the sixth army, deployed in the Chinese port city of Dairen (now Luda) after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945. Their mission was to capture emigres, agents, sympathizers, etc. The short existence of this unit may have given rise to numerous author's claims that airborne divisions are SPETSNAZ.

After the Nazi's surrender, SMERSH's missions included the capture of all German Abwehr, Gestapo, SS, and Rossiiskaya osvoboditel'naya armiya or Russian Liberation Army members (Soviet prisoners of the Nazis who, with Nazi support, fought as a military organization against the Soviets), standard counterintelligence functions, deportations, executions, exterminations, the abduction of Nazi experts, and making available punitive detachments to Soviet advisors (who assisted defense ministers of satellite countries if that minister was not a Soviet general) in every eastern European country in the immediate post-Second World War period.

In May 1946, SMERSH was disbanded and again formed into regular OOs (Otdely kontrrazvedki or counterintelligence sections) of the Third Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence of the MGB, (Tret'ye glavnoye upravleniye kontrrazvedki ministerstva gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti SSSR), although its missions never changed. Bodyguard duties, such as guarding Stalin, became a duty of the Guards Directorate or Okhrana. After the KGB's creation, military counterintelligence was once again called the Third Directorate of Special Departments (Tret'ye upravleniye osobykh otdelov), and incorporated the special sections or OOs. They were also known as soldiers of the "invisible front."

The Administration of Special Sections (UOO or Upravleniye osobykh otdelov) ensured chekist security in the army, navy, and air force, and among MVD troops, the militia, and the state security organs (MVD and KGB). There are twelve major departments in the Third Directorate responsible for counterintelligence, political reliability, or any other directed activity. According to E. A. Andreevich, it is responsible "in war time (or in the area of a minor military engagement), for control of all reconnaissance operations [in effect, special operations] of the Soviet armed forces."

Clearance with the OO's of all reconnaissance personnel and operations has been mandatory in all wars fought by the Soviet Army. Soviet reconnaissance makes use not of the men best fitted for the job but of those who are most reliable politically.<sup>88</sup>

In summary, The fundamental element overseeing armed forces activities are the OO (osobyi otdel). Every unit, whether its a training school, combat echelon, military district, headquarters, fleet, flotilla, squadron, etc., has an OO. Their size corresponds proportionately to unit size. Officers in the OO operate informer networks. These officers are known as upolnomochennyi, or osobists. They are entirely independent of military command, even though they wear their unit's uniform. Their duties exceed mere counterintelligence functions, which have a very broad scope in the Soviet system (including political reliability). OOs even check ammunition during training to insure none is cached. They also control military stockpiles. OO's provide continuous surveillance of the military, approve its orders, and require troop commanders to obtain their concurrence on important issues. But regardless of whether or not it finally controls all military special operations, the Third Directorate's participation in SPETSNAZ operations is now probably limited to activities similar to its missions in any unit.

#### The Fourth (Partisan) Directorate and Partisan Operations

[Partizanskaya borlba or partisan warfare is] one of the forms of active armed conflict by the popular masses for independence of the Motherland against intruding foreign invaders and reactionary governments which collaborate with them, and also against the forces of an internal counter-revolution which have

started a civil war for the purpose of overthrowing popular power. Partisan warfare is waged in enemy rear areas on territory occupied by him.<sup>89</sup>

KGB and GRU predecessors have been involved in guerrilla warfare since the Russian civil war and the Russo-Polish war, where they developed doctrine employed in Spain. And strategy developed in Spain was used by the Soviets in the Second World War. In 1936, during the Spanish civil war, the Soviets organized Republican guerrilla detachments to operate in the Nationalist (fascist) rear. GRU Chief Jan Berzin, the Soviet guerrilla commander in the Russo-Polish war, was sent to Spain to organize these guerrilla units and advise them. One of the sidelights of his mission, which was never accomplished, was to seize Madrid with a select group as a last ditch effort if the fascists won. He also provided personnel, including Colonel, later Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy (future defense minister of Poland), to guerrilla units operating behind fascist lines.

Two saboteur schools, one in Madrid and one in Benimamet (near Valencia), were organized to train approximately 200 personnel each. Four more were eventually initiated, including one in Barcelona for 600 personnel. Mostly Spaniards attended, but among the students were also members of the International Brigade and former Russian tsarist officers wishing to return to the Soviet Union. The students received training in demolitions, marksmanship, tactics (raids and ambushes), land navigation, survival, and forced marches with equipment. These graduates usually performed sabotage missions in groups of seven or nine.



After their first three months of operations, forty percent of the bridges and power lines within sixty kilometers of the front were destroyed. Franco was forced to establish units to deal with them. Then, in the summer of 1937, guerrilla operations grew more sophisticated and deeper. Republican soldiers who lived within 150 kilometers of the front were trained as agents to support guerrilla units. Living with their families, they reported intelligence for guerrilla strikes. This is similar to and the precursor of present Soviet special operations, which also use agents.

Soviet officers were used as cadre/leaders for guerrilla units, for example, in Rio Tinto and Aroche, which were 350 kilometers within fascist territory. Air resupply was used to provide the guerrillas at Rio Tinto with weapons. Two Soviet officers, Major Strik and Captain S. Glushko (who was later killed at Rio Tinto), remained at Rio Tinto for four months, training the guerrillas in combat, and appointing their leader.

Captain Nicolayevsky, who was killed during a raid, led Republican guerrillas in raids against aircraft, airfields, their associated logistics, etc. His unit even conducted operations in fascist and Nazi uniforms with forged identification. Alexander Orlov headed the NKVD presence in Spain. Orlov sent Spain's gold reserves to Moscow and "liquidated" numerous people. He defected in 1938, after Berzin was killed in the purges and Orlov saw his turn coming.

After the Nazi invasion of 1941, the Central Committee established the "Central Staff of the Partisan Movement to Plan and Direct Partisan Operations." Its major elements were the GRU, the 4th Directorate of the NKGB, and the GUKR NKO or SMERSH (headed by Lieutenant General Abakumov, an NKGB officer).

The main value of partisans to the Soviets in the Second World War was to provide tactical intelligence on weak links, other intelligence, and conduct sabotage, disruption, and diversionary operations. Partizanskiye voyennyye deystviya or partisan (guerrilla) operations are

Military operations by armed groups, detachments, and whole formations of volunteers from the local population, or the armed forces, which are waged in enemy rear areas by making surprise attacks on individual garrisons or columns of moving troops, attacks on control centers (headquarters) and various enemy installations, and individual acts of sabotage, for the purpose of disorganizing rear areas, inflicting personnel casualties and losses of combat material on the enemy, and disrupting the normal operation of his communications.<sup>90</sup>

Moscow claims the partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of German troops, collaborators, and occupation administration officials. They are also reputed to have derailed more

than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of freight cars. Partisan operations affected the morale of the German Army, keeping the German troops in a constant state of fear.<sup>91</sup>

NKVD Major General Pavel Sudoplatov, known as the "Master of Special Detachments," directed the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement from Moscow, except for specific partisan operations that directly supported the Red Army and were controlled by respective army level staffs. This bi-level approach still exists today, and the nucleus of today's Soviet special operations community came from Sudoplatov's wartime officers, who served in the MGB after the Second World War.

### **The Border Guards Chief Directorate**

In May 1918, after the civil war ended, Lenin transferred the best Red Army units to border guards duty in the Cheka. By 1923, border guard districts were formed and varied in number through time until the present eight were established. The border guards force now numbers about 300,000 personnel and has its own navy and air force. They are well-equipped with the newest weaponry and have even advised in Vietnam. Although Dziak attributes SPETSNAZ functions to them in Vietnam, there is no evidence of this.<sup>92</sup> Just

as the United States has advisors overseas for almost everything and anything, it would seem natural for the Soviets to have border guards advising on how to be border guards.

Border guard missions include preventing illegal crossings, maintaining border security and security in littoral areas, reacting to border incidents, preventing unauthorized retreats by the army, rear area security, the deportation of unreliable population elements, imposing party control in newly conquered or reconquered territories, deporting anti-communist elites, special communications, and elite guard functions. In many of these missions, the border guards are assisted by the MVD.

During wartime, the border guards implement joint defensive plans with the other armed forces and fight delaying actions, allowing the Soviet army time to prepare for battle by cushioning an invasion blow. The first Soviet soldier killed in the Second World War was a border guard, and border guards engaged the Chinese in the 1969 Battle of Damanskiy Island. Once relieved, border troops are reorganized into regiments and battalions, and redesignated as security troops of the rear of the operational armies.

The largest border guard unit is a border district (pogranichnye okrug), then border detachments (pogranichnye otryady), which contain border command headquarters (pogranichnye komendatury), and are divided into border posts (pogranichnye zastavy) (figure eleven). Wolin and Slusser's widths and depths of coverage by border units follows:<sup>93</sup>




Figure 11 - The Border Detachment

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Width of Area (Kilometers)</u>	<u>Depth of Area (Kilometers)</u>
Border District	1,000 - 3,000	500 - 600
Border Detachment	100 - 500	50 - 150
Border Command Headquarters	25 - 150	15 - 50
Border Post	5 - 25	3 - 15

The Defense Intelligence Agency account, although much later in time, differs little from the former account:

The width and depth of the area controlled by border detachments vary from place to place depending upon the importance of the sector, its topography, and other factors. A border detachment may be responsible for an area extending from 100 to 500 kilometers (62 to 310 miles), with a depth of up to 42 kilometers (26 miles) from the frontier. Each border outpost may patrol an area of from 5 to 22 kilometers (3 to 13.5 miles) and be responsible for a depth of from 2.6 to 15 kilometers (1.5 to 9 miles).

The size and number of units in a district depends upon terrain, population, importance, threat, etc. Boundaries overlap and various zones have special defenses. Since there is no set width or depth of border

districts, the number of border units varies per district. These units are all located along the frontier strip (pogranichnaya polosa), the depth of which varies according to its importance, geography, topography, etc. The frontier strip is divided into restricted zones (rezhimnye zony) of varying degrees of restriction of access. In addition to the Border Guard troops assigned to specific echelons and zones, there are maneuver groups attached to Komendatura and detachment headquarters. These are small, mobile reserves which may be used to reinforce units engaged in border incidents or other critical situations. This unit, which in many ways resembles a flying column, could easily be confused for a SPETSNAZ unit.

Border districts appear to work closely with military districts in counterintelligence and intelligence matters, and have their own sections for these functions. The border guards counterintelligence section's missions include uncovering border violators and deterring espionage; and this section conducts operations on both sides of the border to achieve its missions. The border guards intelligence section's missions include collecting information on the neighboring state. The section is active along the frontier and deep in the target country's interior. The intelligence section's collection priorities specifically include fortified zones, industrial installations, armed forces and protection systems along the frontier, as well as plans to cross illegally into Soviet territory. The intelligence section (razvedyvatel'nye) runs agent networks and operates in coordination with the KGB's other divisions. The depth of its agent penetrations varies in accordance with its efficiency, manpower, and material resources.

The operating methodology of the border guards counterintelligence and intelligence sections, in combination with the presence of border guards maneuver groups, could provoke some authors to misidentify specific border guards units as SPETSNAZ. And it is possible that an elite force, which may be loosely compared to the popular conception of the United States Marine Corps (with the exception of their missions), might have SPETSNAZ forces. However, their missions and method of deployment do not engender any cogent military reason for providing the Border Guards Chief Directorate with this capability.

#### **The Eighth (Communications) Directorate**

It has been asserted the Eighth Directorate has SPETSNAZ or OSNAZ units that are involved in communications security, communications intelligence, and a communications support role.<sup>94</sup> However, there is no evidence to support this contention. It is probable that SPETSNAZ units have troops that perform signals intelligence functions; however, the functions attributed to the "special troops" in the Eighth Directorate are probably redundant and secure communications for the Politburo, STAVKA, State Committee of Defense, etc. This is due to the distrust of regular communications units or the GRU, and is not a special operation, simply a political reality.



## The Ninth (Guards) Directorate

The function of this directorate is to guard the Kremlin, key offices and installations, and the physical protection of party and state leaders. Deriabin makes it clear that the Guards Directorate has been involved in assassinations within the Soviet Union. The assassination of Solomon Mikhoels, a prominent Jew whom Stalin felt was a political liability, is cited by Deriabin as an example.<sup>95</sup>

The Ninth Directorate is also reputed to have regimental and larger troop formations. Deriabin states there are five divisions in the Ninth Directorate and Dziak contends it controls the MVD when necessary.<sup>96</sup> The total personnel strength of the Ninth Directorate may in fact be five divisions, but Dziak overlooks the Soviet penchant for compartmentalization, leverage, and redundant capabilities. The Ninth Directorate includes the Kremlin Kommandatura, the chief components of which are the Officer's Battalion (Otdelny ofitser'sky batalion), the Regiment of Special Purposes (Polk spetsnaznacheniya), the Company of Special Purposes (Rota spetsnaznacheniya), and the Communications Department (Otdel svyazi). The Regiment of Special Purposes has 1,200 personnel whose primary duties are to patrol the Kremlin and guard the Lenin Mausoleum. Its armament includes machineguns, sub-machineguns, and light artillery for ceremonial purposes. The Company of Special Purposes is a fire patrol and accident prevention unit, which among its duties, checks for bombs in furnaces, fireplaces, etc.

Deriabin also claims there are rumors of Ninth Directorate SPETSNAZ with external missions.<sup>97</sup> This seems highly unlikely, since Deriabin makes it clear their more nefarious missions are internal. And Directorate S, Department 8 is apparently not responsible for internal operations, corroborated by its presence in the First Chief Directorate. Again, this type of compartmentation would appear to suit the Soviets. But in 1962, the Ninth Directorate did train an elite guard for Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah at his request, because he feared an assassination attempt. A force of 300 bodyguards was organized and an elite presidential regiment responsible only to Nkrumah was being developed. But their plans were ended prematurely in February 1966 by anti-communist insurgents. This advisory activity, although external, would appear to be within the realm of a normal advisory mission for trainers. The fact that the Ninth Directorate trained an elite bodyguard unit does not give it SPETSNAZ status.

### **MVD Internal Troops**

MVD internal troops are 260,000 personnel in a standard military organization (armed similarly to the border guards minus the aircraft and navy) whose mission is internal security. It acts as a praetorian guard for the party, and is part of the Soviet armed forces, as is the border guard, but is also not part of the defense ministry. Until recently, there were four types of internal troops: special purpose (OSNAZ), convoy, guard, and

railroad. The Defense Intelligence Agency reports signal instead of OSNAZ as one of the four main types, but there is no evidence to support this. Wolin and Slusser state there are also four types of troops, but they were OSNAZ, guards, convoy, and railroad troops. They did not mention signal troops, although there were troops that guard communications sites. Although these functions remain, the distinctions between these troops probably do not, and they now deploy wherever needed. During major revolutionary holidays, for example, OSNAZ reserves are formed. They remain at an increased state of readiness in their barracks, or are secretly stationed at critical nodes.<sup>98</sup>

The Defense Intelligence Agency also claims that OSNAZ may be placed under KGB control for special tasks. Recent actions within the MVD instituted by its new Minister, General V. V. Fedorchuk, a former KGB chief and close associate of the late Yu. V. Andropov, indicate that KGB control of the MVD is probably more pervasive than ever. Due to extensive corruption under Fedorchuk's predecessor, General N. Shcholokov, General Fedorchuk is establishing political organs in the MVD similar to those in the Soviet army, in addition to existing special sections. These positions will probably be filled by more professional KGB officers. However, this is no basis for Dziak's claim that MVD troops remand to the KGB by direction of the KGB chairman, for which Dziak offers no proof.<sup>99</sup> If OSNAZ do occasionally revert to KGB operational control, it is probably in much the same way Third Directorate personnel utilize armed forces units. It does not seem likely that this would occur on a large scale since the two institutions exist separately to counterbalance each other.

The MVD mission is clearly and primarily internal security (for example, putting down strikes, revolts, and controlling the population in the event of a natural disaster), mass repressions and punitive operations, special communications, guard functions (convoys, railroads, and installations, including concentration/labor camps), militia or police duties, criminal investigations, motor vehicle inspection and control, visa issuing, rear area security in wartime, retreat blocking, combat under special conditions, and wartime responsibility for prisoners-of-war. OSNAZ troops receive full military tactical training plus special population control training.

MVD troops' predecessors were created in January 1918. At the time of the Kronstadt mutiny in 1921, no Cheka units existed at regimental or divisional levels. Consequently, Red Army units, which had previously proved politically unreliable, had to be deployed with party cadres. Small Chekist special section machinegun units were probably used to "mow down" any unauthorized retreaters. Kronstadt, however, became the last effective armed defiance of the Soviets for a long time due to the subsequent organization of larger ChON units. A Latvian regiment was at first organized to perform bodyguard functions, but after Latvia separated from the Soviet Union in 1920, it was disbanded due to its political unreliability. Between 1917-1922, the VCheka organized units of special purpose (Chasti osobovo naznacheniya) or ChON, which were created by Central Committee resolution. They were reorganized into troops of the internal guard (Voiska vnutrennei okhrany) or VOKR in 1922. ChON was disbanded at the end of the civil war in 1924. But between 1923 though 1934, the OGPU organized its troops of the OGPU and the NKVD had NKVD troops as well.

The Basmachi movement, in conjunction with the 1920-1922 Daghestani-Chechen mountaineer's uprising, "was certainly the most dangerous popular, mass, anti-Soviet movement."<sup>100</sup> Basmach translates to brigand in Uzbek and is derived from the Turkish verb basmak (to plunder). Basmachi is how the Soviets referred to the Turkish fighters who revolted against them between 1918-1936 in what are now the Kirghiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics. The Turkestanis, conversely, referred to themselves as the Beklar Hareketi (the bek or Freeman's Movement). The Beklar Hareketi actually describes independent movements in Muslim central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana valley, the eastern and southern portions of the former emirate of Bukhara (especially among the Lokay tribe), and in the northern Turkmen steppes.

The revolt was a result of challenging traditional authority and replacing it with Soviet authority, including nationalizing clerically-owned land (waqf), closing religious courts and schools, and passing anti-religious legislation, including reducing the religious tax (zakat) and restricting pilgrimages (hajj). The Beklar Hareketi maintained an advantage until the Soviets defeated the white armies, after which, M.V. Frunze and the Fifth Army arrived in mid-1920 in Turkestan. Still, Enver Pasha, once absolute ruler of Turkey, and the individual providing a focal point for the Beklar Hareketi, presented an impediment the Soviets could not overcome until he was tracked down by G. Agabekov and A. Osipov of the Cheka, who were serving with the intelligence branch (probably a special section) of the Red Army in Turkestan.

They located him and arranged for the Red cavalry to kill him in August 1922. It is not clear whether he was killed by the cavalry or Agabekov, although it is clear he was killed.

The Khorezm Group of Forces was created in the Central Asian Military District in August 1931 to fight the Beklar Hareketi. It included regular military and aviation and OGPU cavalry, artillery, and motorized forces, including the Dzerzhinskiy Division. In April 1931, for example, the 83d Division of the OGPU was sent to the Tadzhik area (eastern Bokhara, western Turkmenistan) to "eliminate" the Beklar Hareketi, which they accomplished by June. In the Karakum area that same month, the 24th Regiment of the 63d OGPU Division recaptured Krasnovodsk from the Beklar Hareketi, whom they finally defeated in this area in October 1933.

The Soviets were a superior force, but the Beklar Hareketi were able to survive into the 1930s because of their knowledge of the terrain and the unflagging support of the population. Unfortunately, the Beklar Hareketi's attempts at secession failed, the concessions the Soviets made to Islam and the Beklar Hareketi proved to be temporary, and it is an understatement to note that Soviet suppression was harsh.

For over 50 years the Soviet authorities have waged an unrelenting attack on the Basmachi in official history and literary accounts of the Civil War period. They seek to depict the Basmachi as brigands rather than the national heroes whom

Castagne...portrayed in "Les Basmachis" (Paris, 1925). The continued vociferous quality of the attack lends support to the conclusion that the Basmachi continue to hold a high place in folk history.<sup>101</sup>

In 1924, two Cheka units were amalgamated into the Division of Special Designation, which in 1926, became the Dzerzhinskiy Detached Motorized Infantry Division of Special Designation, and later, the First Dzerzhinskiy Motorized Infantry Division. This unit still exists (the only one that does) and "emigres and defectors have reported this unit, or others like it, have sensitive external missions beyond that of leadership protection. Such missions would be undertaken in periods of international tension, crises, or actual war."<sup>102</sup> However, Dziak is probably referring to Deriabin's previously addressed account.

In 1933, disorders in the Kuban' district of the North Caucasus, which resulted from the famine accompanying collectivisation, prompted the deployment of the Moscow OSNAZ Division (probably the Dzerzhinskiy Division) and the Moscow Cavalry Regiment of Special Purpose. They instituted harsh measures to put down the uprisings, exiling the entire populations of the Ust'-Lobinski, Kavkazski, and other raions of the Krasnodar Oblast, to Siberia. The population's deportation was officially characterized as "the liquidation of sabotage and counterrevolutionary wrecking."<sup>103</sup>

In 1936, the state security organs and troops of special purpose resettled the indigenous Korean population of the far

eastern territories to Central Asia because they were considered politically unreliable. In 1937-1938, OSNAZ troops conducted mass arrests throughout the Soviet Union, and were constantly ready to put down riots in army units during the arrests of Soviet officers. Two Tashkent-based OSNAZ motorized divisions put down a 1942 insurrection in the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in central Asia. In 1943-1945, NKVD troops conducted mass arrests and deported the remaining populations of the defunct Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic, and numerous other districts in which the population proved unreliable during the German occupation. Other administrative bodies abolished, with their entire populations deported, included the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1941), the Karachay Autonomous Oblast (1943), and the Balkarian portion of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1943). These populations were also deported because they actively opposed the Soviets during the Second World War. To accomplish the deportation of the population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, NKVD troops deployed to designated areas under the pretense of conducting field maneuvers, and were not briefed on their missions until the last moment. The operation was carefully planned so it could be accomplished within twenty-four hours. Participating units included the First Independent Moscow Rifle Division of Special Purpose of the NKVD, the Higher Border Officers' School of the NKVD, the 25th and 26th Border Regiments, and the 95th Order of Lenin Border Regiment of Special Purposes of the NKVD, which deported the entire population of Urus Martan, the seat of the raion.



Because internal troops are organized along the lines of the regular military, with tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc., they are quite able to accomplish independent operations. Their forces include entire divisions and independent regiments of various arms. During World War II, two armies were composed of OSNAZ, one at Tashkent and the other in Moscow. They were used immediately behind the front line of troops to bolster the regular army. In 1943, for example, an NKVD Army of Special Purpose commanded by General I. I. Maslennikov conducted a major breakthrough in the German blue defense line in the Kuban' area and the Taman' Peninsula.

During wartime, troops of special purpose also served as blocking (zagruditel'nye) detachments to prevent unauthorized retreats by the regular armed forces, to conduct particularly important operations for which regular troops are deemed politically unreliable, to provide rear area security, and "combat the anti-Soviet partisan movement and sometimes send special diversionist groups behind the enemy line."<sup>104</sup> There was one OSNAZ regiment per army.

In an alleged coup attempt after Stalin's death, Beria ordered the First Dzerzhinskiy Motorized Infantry Division of Special Designation and its sister Second Division into position in Moscow, but prematurely allowing them to return to their barracks. Then, on 26 June 1953, the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division rolled into Moscow supported by infantry from the Belorussian Military District. Beria's intended coup of 27 June was defused and the Red Army proved to be a valuable counterbalance to the MVD. A similar incident allegedly occurred in 1967. On 26 June 1967, the Kantemirovskaya Tank

Division was presented an award by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic without noting its subject. It is believed this division possibly aborted a coup attempt by Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and former KGB chief Shelepin against Brezhnev sometime between May through July 1967.

Since then it has been reported that MVD units have been involved in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in December 1979. The death of First Deputy Chairman of the MVD Lieutenant General V. S. Paputin was announced one day after the assassination of President Amin of Afghanistan, during which Paputin exercised unspecified duties; although a party security mission in a country littoral to the Soviet Union could involve the MVD. Paputin was part of an earlier Soviet delegation that met with Amin before the coup. He was a candidate member of the Central Committee and a close confidant of Brezhnev, which, along with the political sensitivity of the mission, may explain why he was there. It certainly points out high involvement in special operations.

Although their use on the Soviet littoral is quite possible, MVD troops are not organized for special operations, even though they are OSNAZ. The main feature making them such is their enhanced political reliability for internal operations. And their main function, which can be under KGB direction, is to deal with large internal disorders. It would perhaps be better to call troops with internal missions OSNAZ, and troops with external missions SPETSNAZ. While the Soviet penchant for redundant capabilities

indicates SPETSNAZ would exist in the MVD, military special operations now appear to be performed solely by the KGB and GRU. The MVD's OSNAZ now solely conduct internal political operations. The internal troops' SPETSNAZ capability existed in a period when KGB functions were not as carefully delineated. For example, their SPETSNAZ capability may have resided with NKVD troops, such as the 95th Order of Lenin Border Regiment of Special Purposes. This unit demonstrates why, based on its designation, analysts confuse internal troops and the border guards with SPETSNAZ. But these units only existed during the Second World War, and their capabilities and missions have since been absorbed by the KGB. The question of MVD SPETSNAZ, however, cannot be conclusively decided until more recent information is forthcoming.

## CHAPTER VI

### WARSAW PACT FORCES AND MILITARY SURROGATES

Service A maintains liaison with Cuban and east European intelligence services and coordinates their activities with its own. The Soviet Union uses military surrogates, including Warsaw Pact members, Cuba, North Korea, and "liberation" groups when it has a need for "plausible denial", acceptability in places where the Soviet Union would not receive it, and due to geographic considerations. In El Salvador, for example, the Soviet Union has been covertly supplying weapons primarily through its east European surrogates. The use of surrogates, particularly for the purpose of "plausible denial", is an interesting strategy which the United States all too often ignores.

Most of the Warsaw Pact members have at least a battalion or regiment of airborne. Bulgaria has army special commando companies and one air force parachute regiment; Czechoslovakia one airborne brigade; the German Democratic Republic one airborne battalion; Hungary one airborne battalion; Poland one airborne division; and Romania one airborne regiment. But only the Soviets have the strategic airlift capability to deploy them at strategic depths.


Some of these units are reputed to include special operations forces. The Poles also have naval "frogmen" and the East Germans have "frogmen" in their airborne battalion. Dziak and Donnelly believe there are 20,000 Warsaw Pact troops available for special operations.<sup>105</sup> East German, Polish, and Czech airborne troops have conducted exercises in West German Bundeswehr, Danish, British Army of the Rhine, and United States Seventh Army uniforms. However, it does seem that 20,000 is a grossly inflated figure, especially since that figure does not include general airborne forces. Regardless of their aggregate, it is important to calculate on Warsaw Pact forces bolstering Soviet forces in Europe and throughout the world.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The Soviet leadership remains viable because of an overwhelming state security organization that uses power and terror to repress its people. While it is clear the Soviets conduct active measures similar to American military special operations, there are many other political activities conducted by SPETSNAZ that also fall under the rubric active measures that are not similar to anything Americans would even imagine. "Spetsial'noye" or the "special" in troops of special purpose would normally be associated with the English word elite. But many of the forces touted by the west as conducting special operations are actually conducting political activities. They are elite or "special" to the Soviet mind, and in fact, based on their training; but the west must be more careful in this regard.

SPETSNAZ command and control is reposed in the most senior echelons: the party secretary, Politburo, STAVKA, KGB, and the general staff (figure twelve). The Soviet leadership has had a role in building up SPETSNAZ capabilities and in directing their operations, and has demonstrated its willingness to deploy them for power projection. By way of example, on 3 November 1956, (then Ambassador) Yu. A. Andropov lured Hungarian Defense Minister Pal Maleter to a banquet. KGB Chairman Ivan Serov and others



**Figure 12 - The Soviet Union's Active Measures Organization  
for Special Operations**

present then kidnapped Maleter, who was later murdered by the Soviets. On 22 November, on his way home, Imre Nagy was removed from a bus by Soviet officers and deported to Romania, where he also was murdered.

SPETSNAZ particularly pose a threat in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Reaction time to these forces will be short, at best. While they are not in as great numbers or diversity of units as has been bandied about, they still should not be underestimated. SPETSNAZ brigada are responsible for military special operations. They are trained as "frogmen" and parachutists and can ultimately be controlled by the KGB. The KGB is the only other organization with SPETSNAZ forces for special operations. They appear to reside in Service A (in a supervisory role) and Directorate S, Department 8 of the First Chief Directorate. Additionally, the Third Directorate may at least have veto power or the power to initiate operations, although it has conducted operations in wartime.

There are three major lessons for United States forces that can be extrapolated from SPETSNAZ operations. First, the Soviets are a great deal more imaginative than credited. For example, there is a tendency to severely confine American airborne troops to certain types of missions, and concomitantly, always hold out the hope of their use in mass drops. Soviet conventional airborne missions are more diversified. But viewed from the American perspective, it is often incorrectly assumed because of "mirror imaging", they must be special operations forces.



Secondly, the Soviets have a dedicated SPETSNAZ agent network to support their sabotage activities and plans. This is essential to special operations and would have saved the United States much heartache in Iran. The Soviets don't subscribe to the conviction that a country should maintain only one multi-purpose agent network, as does the United States. Different priorities and outlooks of American foreign intelligence case officers and state department officers vis-a-vis its special operations officers prohibits the United States from developing a network responsive for special operations. In a pinch, it's too late to develop an agent network. It must always be "on the ground", ready to activate.

Finally, the United States doesn't plan for the presence of SPETSNAZ during United States military operations. The Soviets are not to be underestimated, and it is self-evident that if something is of strategic importance to the United States, the Soviets will be aware of it, and vice versa. Therefore, at many targets of common strategic interest where United States Special Forces might deploy, it is possible a larger SPETSNAZ force may already be "on the ground"; particularly if the operation is in a country littoral to the Soviet Union. If the destruction or preservation of the target in question has broad implications on the course of a battle or war, than the possibility of encountering SPETSNAZ during an operation must be seriously addressed.

It is commonly held that the Soviets assign sensitive missions to politically reliable troops, since for whatever reason, other troops cannot be entrusted to complete them. It is rarely acknowledged that the military

eccentricities of certain missions require elite troops, who in the Soviet Union must also be politically reliable. While the breadth of SPETSNAZ and OSNAZ may be great, only a minority of them are politically reliable elite forces that conduct military special operations. The remainder are politically reliable forces that conduct political activities. In conclusion, SPETSNAZ and the intelligence organs figured prominently in Lenin's strategy. A strategy which remains vital.

As a result of my own personal observations during the years of my emigration, I must say that the so called cultural strata of Western Europe and America are not capable of understanding the contemporary state of affairs nor the actual alignment of forces; we must regard these strata as deaf mutes and act with respect to them accordingly.

The revolution never develops in a straight line, in continuous crescendo, but forms a chain fashioned of explosions and then retreats, of attacks and pacifications during which the revolutionary forces gain strength, preparing their final victory.

On the basis of these same observations, and taking into account the duration of the growth of the world socialist revolution, it is necessary to resort to special maneuvers capable of accelerating our victory over capitalist countries:

a) To declare, so as to reassure the deaf and dumb the separation (fictitious) of our government and governmental agencies (such as the Council of People's Ministers etc.) from the Party and the Politburo - and especially from the Comintern, and to declare that these latter agencies are only independent groups allowed to exist on the territory of the USSR. THE DEAF AND DUMB WILL BELIEVE.

b) To express the desire for immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with the capitalist countries on the basis of strict non-interference in their internal affairs. THE DEAF AND DUMB WILL AGAIN BELIEVE. They will even rejoice, and fling open their doors -- through which the emissaries of the Comintern and the organs of party intelligence will immediately infiltrate these countries under the guise of our diplomatic cultural and trade representatives.

To speak the truth -- is a petty bourgeois prejudice.

The Lie on the other hand, is often justified by its end.

The capitalists of the entire world, and their governments, in the rush of conquering Soviet markets, will close their eyes to the above mentioned realities, and will thus become BLIND DEAF MUTES. They will open credits which will serve as a support for the Communist Party in their countries and will provide us

with essential materials and technology thus restoring our military industries, essential for our future victorious attacks on our suppliers. Speaking otherwise, they will be working to prepare their own suicides."106

## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Known as osoboye naznachenkiye (OSNAZ) before the Second World War, and as voiska osobovo naznacheniya prior to their current designation.

<sup>2</sup>John Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension," Orbis (Winter 1981): 784.

<sup>3</sup>Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, trans. DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 205.

<sup>4</sup>Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1982), p. 278.

<sup>5</sup>Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 156.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 323.

<sup>7</sup>L. Brezhnev, Speech at 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 1976.

<sup>8</sup>Earle, Makers, p. 141.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>11</sup>John Dziak, "The Soviet Approach to Special Operations," in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. Frank R. Barnett, Hugh B. Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press and National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1984), p. 98; and Peter L. Bunce "Soviet Airborne: The Quiet Revolution," Military Intelligence (October-December 1982): 5.

<sup>12</sup>Dziak, "Soviet Approach," p. 99.

<sup>13</sup>Friedrich Wiener, Die Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten [The Armies of the Warsaw Pact] (Vienna: Carl Urberreuter, 1981), p. 163.

<sup>14</sup>Sascha Demidow [pseud.], "Wir Schossen Besser Als Cowboys" [We Shot Better Than Cowboys], Der Spiegel, 20 July 1970, pp. 86-93.

<sup>15</sup>Washington Post, 19 October 1973; Washington Star, 29 October 1973; Washington Post, 29 October 1973.

<sup>16</sup>Washington Post, 20 July 1974.

<sup>17</sup>Mark L. Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," Defence (March 1981): 201; Bunce, "Soviet Airborne," p. 6; Dziak, "Soviet Approach," p. 103; and Washington Post, 7 January 1980.

<sup>18</sup>Jiri Valenta, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention: Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception," Survival (March-April 1982): 55, 56, 59; and Kenneth Allard, "Soviet Airborne Forces and Preemptive Power Projection," Military Review (December 1980): 47.

<sup>19</sup>Dziak, "Soviet Approach," p. 115.

<sup>20</sup>Washington Post, 7 January 1980.

<sup>21</sup>Valenta, "Perspectives," p. 57.

<sup>22</sup>Scott and Scott, eds., Soviet Art of War, p. 200.

<sup>23</sup>Bunce, "Soviet Airborne," p. 7; Friedrich Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 180; and Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Forces: Increasingly Powerful Factor in the Equation," Army, April 1976, p. 21.

<sup>24</sup>Fifty thousand according to Aleksei Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training for World War III," Soviet Analyst, 20 December 1979, p. 3; 60,000 according to Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 180; and 80,000 according to Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 200.

<sup>25</sup>The eight division figure is accepted by Viktor Suvorov [Pseud.], Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Macmillan, 1982), P. 85; Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage," p. 4; Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 182; and Bunce, "Soviet Airborne," p. 6; while ten divisions is advocated by Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 202.

<sup>26</sup>Suvorov, Inside, p. 89.

<sup>27</sup>Author "A" is Bunce, "Soviet Airborne," p. 6; and Author "B" is Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 200.

<sup>28</sup>Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage," p. 3.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Intelligence Agency. Review of the Soviet Ground Forces, 3-81, October 1981, p. 4.

<sup>30</sup>Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence," p. 775; Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage," p. 5; Henry S. Whittier, "Soviet Special Operations/Partisan Warfare: Implications for Today," Military Review, January 1979, p. 49; and Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 200.

<sup>31</sup>Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 130.

<sup>32</sup>Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence," p. 780; Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage," p. 3.

<sup>33</sup>Dictionary, p. 45.

<sup>34</sup>Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 201.

<sup>35</sup>Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 158.

<sup>36</sup>Scott and Scott, eds., Soviet Art of War, p. 51.

<sup>37</sup>Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 158; Urban, "Soviet Airborne Forces," p. 200; and Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1979), p. 98.

<sup>38</sup>Wiener, Die Armeen, p. 142.

<sup>39</sup>Dictionary, p. 101.

<sup>40</sup>U.S., Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, Hearings. 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 42.

<sup>41</sup>Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, trans. Peter Deriabin (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 87; Aleksei Myagkov, "The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Soviet Analyst, 9 January 1980, p. 4; Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence," p. 775; and John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974), p. 463.

<sup>42</sup>Suvorov, Inside, p. 98.

<sup>43</sup>Penkovskiy, Papers, p. 88.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>47</sup>U.S., Active Measures, p. 140.



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51Ibid., p. 80.

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53Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage," p. 6.

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56Ibid., p. 5.

57Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence," p. 783; Donnelly, "Enemy Rear," p. 30; Urban, Soviet Airborne, p. 200; and Suvorov, Inside, p. 76.

58Myagkov, "Special Forces," p. 4.

59Suvorov, Inside, p. 87.

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61Ibid., pp. 84-86.

62Ibid.

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64Myagkov, "Special Forces," p. 4.

65Suvorov, Inside, p. 87.

66Myagkov, "Special Forces," p. 4.

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